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NOTE
Criminal Restitution and Bankruptcy Code Discharge-
Another Case for Defining the Scope of Federal
Bankruptcy Law
Of the many conflicts between the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
(Bankruptcy Code)' and other areas of substantive law,2 few have
presented a greater dilemma than the dispute over whether bankruptcy
courts may discharge criminal restitutionary sentences.3 The compelling
policy concerns that underly the areas of bankruptcy law and criminal law
involved in this dispute make it particularly difficult. Discharge in bank-
ruptcy attempts to provide relief and rehabilitation to individual debt-
ors,4 while criminal restitution offers a sentencing alternative to criminal
courts to enable them to fashion more appropriate sentences. 5 While
legislatures and courts have increasingly relied on restitution 6 as a sen-
tencing alternative for a wide variety of crimes, 7 some bankruptcy courts
have ordered sentences of criminal restitution discharged under Chap-
I Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) [hereinafter "Bankruptcy Code"], as codified at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1330, and as amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments and FederalJudgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (19.84).
2 See iqfra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
3 See generally Ballam, Kelly v. Robinson: An Erosion of the Fresh Start Concept for Debtors in Bank-
ruptcy, 32 ST. Louis U.LJ. 103 (1987); Hennigan, Criminal Restitution and Bankruptcy Law in the Federal
System, 19 CONN. L. REV. 89 (1986); Note, Banknptcy: Dischargeability of Restitutive Conditions of Proba-
tion-Criminals Find Refuge in the Provisions of the Banknptcy Reform Act of l978-Robinson v. McGuigan,
31 VILL. L. REV. 591 (1986).
4 See infra notes 140-175 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 176-201 and accompanying text. Federal bankruptcy legislation does not impli-
cate constitutional issues when it conflicts with other federal legislation. Conflicts between federal
legislation are dealt with purely on the level of statutory interpretation. However, because the rela-
tion of bankruptcy law to other federal law is not clarified by the language of the statutes or the
intent of Congress in many instances, an analysis along the same lines as that for the dischargeability
of state criminal restitution sentences is appropriate. Thus, the same analysis discussed below is
applicable to the issue of the dischargeability offederal sentences of criminal restitution. See, e.g, 11
U.S.C. § 3663 (1982 & Supp. IV 1988). This Note, however, will primarily focus on state criminal
restitution provisions because federal courts dealing with federal criminal cases have held federal
criminal restitution unaffected by bankruptcy discharge. See, e.g., United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d
216 (5th Cir. [unit B] 1982).
6 For states with sentencing schemes utilizing various forms of criminal restitution, see, e.g.,
ALA. CODE §§ 15-23-1 to 15-23-23, and §§ 15-18-65 to 15-18-77 (1972 & Supp. 1988); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 12.55.045 and 12.55.100(a)(2) (Supp. 1988); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-603(C), 13-804 to 13-
810, and 13-901 (Supp. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-4-303(c)(8), and 16-90-301 to 16-90-308
(1987); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13967 to 13967.5 (West Supp. 1988), and CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.04
(West Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-1 1-204.5 (1986 & Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-30(a)(4) (West Supp. 1988), and §§ 54-201 to 54-224 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4101 to 4106 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 3-401 to 3-415 (1988); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 775.089 (West Supp. 1988), and § 960.28 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988).
7 Although criminal restitution can be assigned in sentences for a wide variety of crimes, there
are some crimes for which criminal restitution might be an inappropriate sentence. See S. SCHAFER,
COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME 119-20 (1960).
Although this Note relies on a foundationally grounded analysis which presumes that criminal
restitution is an appropriate sentence, there is some debate as to whether it is appropriate at all to
provide for restitution in criminal sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., Klien, Revitalizing Restitution: Flog-
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ters 78 and 139 of the Bankruptcy Code, allowing debtors in bankruptcy
to escape from sentences of criminal restitution.' 0
Federal bankruptcy courts have approached the issue of the dis-
chargeability of criminal restitution on an ad hoc basis, struggling to find
a consistent rationale to resolve the issue. I This ad hoc approach fails to
reconcile interpretation of the broad and often ambiguous language of
the Bankruptcy Code with the fundamental goals and policies which
bankruptcy law has long embodied. Such a return to the fundamentals of
bankruptcy law is necessary because the federal bankruptcy power
ging a Horse that maY have been Killed for Just Cause, 20 CRIM. L.Q. 383, 404-05 (1978); but see infra note
204.
8 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982). Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code covers cases involving the
liquidation of the debtor's non-exempt assets to satisfy, as best it can, the debts of the debtor. See,
e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 704, which obliges the trustee to "collect and reduce to money the property of the
estate for which such trustee serves." Id. at § 704(1). After liquidation, the estate is distributed
among the debtor's creditors according to the priority of each debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 726.
9 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982). Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is known as the "wage
earner's" chapter because it allows qualified individual debtors to avoid liquidation of their assets by
submitting all or some portion of their future earnings to the trustee pursuant to a "plan" to pay
some or all of the debtor's debts. See I 1 U.S.C. § 1322, which states in relevant part:
(a) The plan shall-
(1) provide for the submission of all or such portion of future earnings or other future
income of the debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee as is necessary for the
execution of the plan;
(2) provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to
priority under [11 U.S.C. § 507], unless the holder of a particular claim agrees to a different
treatment of such claim; and
(3) if the plan classifies claims, provide the same treatment for each claim within a
particular class.
11 U.S.C. § 132 2 (a)(1)-(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1988).
10 See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. A discharge in bankruptcy of a criminal restitu-
tion obligation should have no effect on any other elements of a criminal sentence which stand
independently even though given concurrently.
11 The ad hoc approach of bankruptcy courts often relies on tortured construction of ambiguous
statutory language at issue in individual cases without reference to the broader policy conflicts which
are discussed in this Note. See T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAw (1986),
where the author argues for a method of inquiry based on the theoretical framework of bankruptcy
law. Professor Jackson states:
Much bankruptcy analysis is flawed precisely because it lacks rigor in identifying what is
being addressed and why it is a proper concern of bankruptcy law. For that reason, when a
new and urgent "problem" is discovered in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, courts,
legislators, and commentators all too often approach its resolution in an ad hoc manner, by
viewing bankruptcy law as somehow conflicting with-and perhaps overriding-some other
urgent social or economic goal.
Id. at 3.
See also A. NAMDAR, CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY (1977), where the author expresses similar
concerns:
The complexity of the issues [in bankruptcy law] in combination with the convergence of
various bodies of law have made the subject a difficult and subtle one. Therefore, it is quite
understandable that many controversies and conflicting attitudes have arisen with regard to
bankruptcy in general .... Moreover, the lack of an overall theoretical approach has aggra-
vated the discrepancies among court decisions and further contributed to the uncertainties
in the area.... [Olne would expect some theoretical guidance from authors in the field.
Unfortunately, the writers, by and large, have been preoccupied with the conventional questions
overlooking the need for a theoretical approach which could have obviated manY of the prevailing problems
Id. at I (emphasis added). See also Klee & Merola, Ignoring Congressional Intent: Eight Years of Judicial
Legislation, 62 Am. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1 (1988) ("first eight years ofjurisprudence under the Bankruptcy
Code is riddled with opinions in which the judiciary has gone astray from the drafters' original
intent").
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originates in the Constitution. 12 Because the Bankruptcy Code is en-
acted pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause, 13 the scope of the Bankruptcy
Clause should necessarily limit the scope of the Bankruptcy Code. The
scope of the federal bankruptcy power may be defined by examining the
fundamental policies and goals of bankruptcy law. After the appropriate
scope of the bankruptcy power is defined, the Bankruptcy Code's ambig-
uous language may be interpreted consistently and coherently.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve
the issue of the dischargeability of criminal restitution in Kelly v. Robin-
son, 14 the Court limited its holding to discharge in Chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. The Court expressly declined to use reasoning that courts
could apply to discharge under other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code.15
As a consequence, bankruptcy courts remain divided over the issue in
other bankruptcy situations.'
6
A sound determination of the dischargeability of criminal restitution
requires an appraisal of the fundamental purposes and policies of bank-
ruptcy law and criminal law to define the scope of the Bankruptcy Code
in this situation. Part I of this Note examines the nature and history of
the dischargeability of criminal restitution including the numerous judi-
cial attempts at a solution. Part II reviews the fundamental purposes and
mechanisms of both bankruptcy law and criminal sentencing in order to
provide the basis for balancing the goals of each. Building on this basis,
Part III presents judicial and legislative solutions that could not only re-
solve the conflict with criminal restitution, but also provide a framework
for resolving conflicts between the Bankruptcy Code and other areas of
law. Finally, this Note concludes that the underlying policies and goals
of bankruptcy law and criminal sentencing demand that bankruptcy law
be considered completely separate from criminal law, and as such incapa-
ble of affecting criminal sentences.
I. The Conflict
Judicial interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code has been required to
settle many conflicts between bankruptcy law and other areas of law.' 7 In
many cases of conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and state law, the
Bankruptcy Clause and Supremacy Clause of the Constitution eliminate
12 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, which gives Congress the power "[t]o establish ... uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States."
13 See id.
14 479 U.S. 36 (1986); discussed infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
15 See I 1 U.S.C. § 523, and infra note 88. By limiting its holding to § 523 and Chapter 7 dis-
charges, the Court left open the relation of criminal restitution to other areas of the Bankruptcy
Code. See 479 U.S. at 59 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
16 See infra notes 95-125 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text. At the core of the conflict over the dis-
chargeability of criminal restitution is the Bankruptcy Code's definition of debt. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(4)
and (11), set out infra note 28. In expanding the definition of debt to include criminal restitution,
the scope of the Bankruptcy Code is also expanded to encompass criminal sentences such as criminal
restitution. This expansion not only gives rise to the issue'of the dischargeability of criminal restitu-
tion, but also produces conflicts with other areas of the Bankruptcy Code. See hfra notes 119-125
and accompanying text.
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any possible conflict by preempting the state law.18 However, there are
some conflicts which courts cannot so easily resolve. On the surface,
such conflicts appear to require preemption. However, on a more funda-
mental level, there are some areas of state law that the Bankruptcy Code
purports to preempt that are fundamentally outside the proper scope of
the Bankruptcy Clause. The dischargeability of criminal restitution is
just such a case. By examining the dischargeability of criminal restitu-
tion, one may develop a method of inquiry that can be helpful in deter-
mining the proper scope of the Bankruptcy Clause and the Bankruptcy
Code in other situations.
A. Criminal Restitution and the Bankruptcy Process
In the typical criminal restitution case, the convicted criminal' 9 is
sentenced by a criminal court 20 to pay a certain sum21 in "restitution" for
his crime. 22 The state then turns over all or some portion of that amount
to the victim of the crime.2 3 The conflict with bankruptcy law arises after
18 See infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
19 Criminal restitution in every sentencing scheme is usually preceeded by a criminal conviction.
See statutes cited supra note 6. But see Harland, Aonetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the
Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 52, 81-86 (1982):
Many provisions for restitution cover only specified types or degrees of crime; others
exclude particular offenses, such as traffic or petty offenses .... [H]owever, there is sub-
stantial disagreement as to whether restitution is restricted to convictions, or whether
"criminal activities" encompasses plea bargaining settlements or offenses which may never
be adjudicated or even formally charged.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
20 Criminal restitution provisions of statutory schemes must be kept analytically separate from
the civil remedies which are increasingly made available in criminal statutes. See, e.g., the civil reme-
dies available in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1988). See also Harland, supra note 19, at 66-67.
21 The standard used for fixing the amount of the restitution sentence presents several
problems. See Harland, supra note 19, at 86-94, where the author discusses the range of recoverable
losses from the criminal act and its relation to civil procedures for fixing damages:
Once the court resolves whether to require restitution .... further refinement of the
scope of the sanction requires consideration of the type and extent of loss for which crimi-
nal courts may impose a restitutive disposition. Criminal and civil courts differ in this area
more than in any other in their ability to redress victims' injuries.
The degree to which courts impose limitations upon -the type of criminal restitution,
and the ways in which these limitations are defined, vary considerably .... With few excep-
tions, criminal liability for restitution is usually considered to be less complete than its civil
counterparts so that conduct producing a viable civil claim will not guarantee a similar re-
sult in a criminal proceeding.
Id. at 86-87 (footnotes omitted). This is an important point because the Bankruptcy Code's defini-
tion of "debt" seems to be directed more towards civil liabilities. See infra note 28.
22 See Harland, supra note 19, at 60-64, for a discussion of the various labels which legislatures
have given to the concept of criminal restitution. "[T]ypically, restitution is defined as 'full or partial
payment of damages to a victim,' with occasional variation to include 'nominal' payment." Id. at 64
(footnotes omitted). For the purposes of this Note, the term "restitution" will be used in the same
way that Professor Harland described it, that of "encompassing either the defendant's return or
repair of property, or the defendant's provision of monetary value for compensable losses." Id.
23 Under many state victim compensation schemes, the victim is paid from a victim compensa-
tion fund maintained by the state, and the state will then be the recipient of the restitution. See
Harland, supra note 19, at 70 ("the most systematic approach [of restitution schemes] attempts to
recover monies paid out by the state as victim compensation awards"). See also, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 1203-1203.1 (West Supp. 1988); and statutory provisions cited supra note 6.
Another issue often arises as to who or what is the "victim" to which the restitution is directed.
See Harland, supra note 19, at 78-80, where the author surveys the divergent ways in which states
have defined legally eligible recipients:
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the criminal court hands down the restitution sentence. 24 If the criminal
enters the bankruptcy process, either voluntarily or involuntarily, 25 the
bankruptcy court must then decide 26 whether the provisions governing
discharge under the Bankruptcy Code27 include such criminal sentences
within their scope.
28
If a court decides that the Bankruptcy Code encompasses the crimi-
nal sentence of restitution, then a further question of whether the sen-
tence is dischargeable arises. 29 The discharge process in the Bankruptcy
Code is essentially one of form over substance. If the debtor meets all of
the formal requirements of the Bankruptcy Code,30 then a wide variety of
debts may be discharged by the court.31 The discharge available in a
The degree of specificity in legislative directives concerning who may be the recipient
of restitution varies widely. On occasion, specific types of victims or "aggrieved parties"
are listed. Similarly, some states single out particular types of victims, such as the elderly,
as deserving special consideration for restitution, and declare others, such as accomplices
or coparticipants in the defendant's crime, ineligible.
Id. at 78 (footnotes omitted).
Regardless of how victim is defined, some courts require that there be some beneficiary of the
restitution who has been injured by the criminal conduct. See, e.g., State v. Theroff, 33 Wash. App.
741, 744, 657 P.2d 143, 145-46 (1962); and Note, Court-Ordered Criminal Restitution in Washington, 62
WAsH. L. REV. 357, 362 (1987).
24 A conflict may also arise ifa'trustee seeks an automatic stay to enjoin a concurrent criminal
action against a defendant who is also a debtor in bankruptcy. Such an attempt would be made
under § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. However, § 362(b)(1) protects such ongoing criminal pro-
ceedings from that type of interference by exempting "the commencement or contifiuation of a
criminal action or proceeding against'the debtor" from the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1).
25 See generally G. TREISTER, J. TROST, L. FORMAN, K. KLEE & R. LEVIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANK-
RUP-rCy LAW 99-111 (1986). "A voluntary petition may be filed by any eligible debtor .... Undoubt-
edly, the debtor must owe some debts in order to seek voluntary relief under the Code, but no
particular amount of money owed is a prerequisite." Id. at 99-100. See also 11 U.S.C. § 301. Invol-
untary cases, however, may only be commenced by the debtor's creditors under Chapters 7 and 11
of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(a) & (b). Involuntary Chapter 7 or 11 cases can be
"converted" by the eligible debtor into any other chapter, including Chapter 13, for which the
debtor would have been eligible had he filed under that chapter voluntarily. See 11 U.S.C. § 348.
26 If the debtor lists his sentence of criminal restitution as one of his debts, then the person or
entity to which the restitution must be paid must file a timely notice of claim and objection to dis-
charge for the court to consider the claim. See I 1 U.S.C. §§ 501, 727(c) & (d), and 1328. However,
in Kelly v. Robinson, the state's failure to file a timely notice of claim was not considered an impedi-
ment to allowing the claim to survive discharge. See 479 U.S. 36, 53-54 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
27 In Chapter 7, discharge is governed by § 727, but limited by the exceptions to discharge in
§ 523. In Chapter 13, discharge is governed by § 1328, but limited to a lesser extcnt by § 523(a)(5).
28 A discharge under Chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is only available for the "debts"
of the debtor. See infra note 58. The Bankruptcy Code defines "debt" as "liability on a claim." 11
U.S.C. § 101(1 1). "Claim" is then defined as a:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equita-
ble, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach ofperformance ifsuch breach gives rise to
a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judg-
ment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured or unsecured;
II U.S.C. § 101(4).
29 Even if criminal restitution is considered a "debt" under the Bankruptcy Code, it must still
escape the exceptions to discharge contained in § 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code before it may be
discharged. See infra note 61.
30 See, e.g., II U.S.C. §§ 727, 1328.
31 The only debts which are not eligible for discharge are listed specifically in § 523(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). Ifa "debt" does not fit within an enumerated exception,
then it is eligible for discharge.
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Chapter 7 proceeding is more limited than the discharge available in a
Chapter 13 proceeding. 32 Although the Supreme Court has ruled that
criminal restitution is excluded from Chapter 7 discharge, 33 courts are
divided on the question of whether bankruptcy courts have the power to
discharge sentences of criminal restitution in Chapter 13.34
In addition to the immediate relief of discharge, the Bankruptcy
Code contains other devices designed to protect the individual debtor
and the bankruptcy process from interference by other judicial
processes. 35 The Bankruptcy Code provides for an "automatic stay" 36
during the bankruptcy proceeding which bars many other judicial actions
to enforce a claim against the bankrupt debtor arising from a pre-bank-
ruptcy debt.37 Many cases involving criminal restitutionary sentences
have arisen when the debtor sought enforcement of the automatic stay to
bar a criminal court proceeding on probation revocation. 38 In addition,
after discharge and other claim settlement procedures have been com-
pleted, the Bankruptcy Code finalizes its disposition of the debtor's fi-
nancial affairs by providing for a permanent injunction 39 barring future
action on any debt discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding.40 Both the
automatic stay and permanent injunction act to protect the integrity of
the discharge.
B. Judicial Attempts to Resolve the Conflict
The dispute over the dischargeability of criminal restitution arose
initially under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.4 1 Lower courts and
32 See infra note 95.
33 See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
34 See cases discussed infra notes 94-125 and accompanying text.
35 The act of filing a petition in bankruptcy has serious consequences on the availability of other
remedies for creditors.
36 See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
37 Section 362 provides in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed ... operates as a
stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation... of ajudicial, administrative, or other action
or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the [bankruptcy case];
(b) The filing of a petition ... does not operate as a stay-
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, 6f the commencement or continuation of a
criminal action or proceeding against the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a),(b).
38 See, e.g., Davenport v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep't of Public Welfare (1n re Daven-
port), 89 Bankr. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1988), discussed infra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
39 See I1 U.S.C. § 524.
40 Section 524 provides in relevant part:
(a) A discharge under this title-
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action,
the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a per-
sonal liability of the debtor . . . ; and
(3) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action,
to collect or recover from, or offset against, property of the debtor. .
II U.S.C. § 524(a)(2)-(3).
41 See II U.S.C. §§ 701-766.
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commentators were divided over the issue.42 In Kelly v. Robinson,43 the
Supreme Court held that criminal restitution is excluded from discharge
in Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.44 The Court's holding in Robinson,
however, left open the question of the dischargeability of criminal resti-
tution in Chapter 13 cases. 45 Courts have been divided over the issue in
the Chapter 13 context.46 This Part will first examine conflicts under the
former Bankruptcy Act, then under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
This Part will conclude with a discussion of Kelly v. Robinson and its effect
on Chapter 13.
Under the Bankruptcy Act, courts seldom encountered the issue of
the dischargeability of criminal restitution.47 However, when confronted
with the issue, they looked to the underlying policies of the Act for the
solution. In In re Uhe,48 for example, the debtor was convicted of the
crime of concealing or transferring encumbered property.49 The debtor
received a sentence of probation conditioned on the payment of restitu-
tion. 50 In holding that the sentence of criminal restitution "did not cre-
ate a debt within the meaning of Section 1(14) of the Bankruptcy Act," 5'
the referee in bankruptcy looked to the underlying nature of the criminal
restitution sentence to determine whether it fell within the Bankruptcy
Act's definition of debt.52 With the rise in individual bankruptcies under
42 See infra notes 56-57.
43 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
44 See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 96-125 and accompanying text.
47 See, e.g., In re Moore, 111 F. 145 (W.D. Ky. 1901), where the dischargeability of a fine imposed
in a criminal sentence was denied. In reaching this conclusion, the court looked to the nature and
purpose of the conflicting bodies of law stating:
It may suffice to say that nothing but a ruling from a higher court would convince me that
congress... intended to permit the discharge.., of any judgment rendered by a state or
federal court imposing a fine in the enforcement of criminal laws, as such, of eitherjurisdic-
tion .... [I]t was never intended in this indirect way... to relieve criminals from penalties
incurred for criminal acts. . .. [T]o rule otherwise would make the bankrupt court the
means of frustrating proper efforts to enforce criminal statutes enacted for the public wel-
fare .... The provisions of the bankrtpt act have reference alone to civil liabilities, as demanded
between debtor and creditor, as such, and not to punishments inflicted pro bono publico for crimes
committed.
Ill F. at 149-150 (emphasis added). But cf In re Alderson, 98 F. 588 (D.W. Va. 1899), where the
court found a criminal fine dischargeable. Interestingly, in reaching this result, the court in Alderson
did not consider the nature and purpose of criminal sentencing as compared to that of bankruptcy
law. See also Ballam, Kelly v. Robinson: An Erosion of the Fresh Start Concept for Debtors in Bankruptcy, 32
ST. Louis U.LJ. 103, 122 (1987).




52 The court differentiated between the origins of civil and criminal monetary obligations:
The determination of the amount a defendant shall pay as a condition to probation is not a
civil matter involving the recovery of money owing to a party; it is a factor in a criminal
proceeding. Restitution has been construed as the amount for which the defendant was
found guilty, or the amount that he admits he should pay .... Certain judgments are not
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the new Bankruptcy Code, 53 and the concurrent rise in the use of crimi-
nal restitution in sentencing,54 a greater number of cases have presented
the issue under the Bankruptcy Code. Initially, attempts to discharge
sentences of criminal restitution were found in Chapter 7 proceedings. 55
1. Chapter 7 Discharge and Kelly v. Robinson
Prior to Kelly v. Robinson, bankruptcy courts were divided over the
issue of the dischargeability of criminal restitution under Chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code.56 They relied on a variety of rationales to support
decisions on the issue.57 Because the discharge provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code apply only to "debts," 58 many courts sought to avoid incon-
53 In 1970, there were 194,000 petitions filed with bankruptcy courts, and 191,000 cases pend-
ing. In 1986, there were 477,856 petitions filed, and 729,000 cases pending. See STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 501 (1988 ed.). Of the cases filed in 1986, 332,679 were under
Chapter 7, while 120,726 cases were filed under Chapter 13. Id.
54 See Harland, supra note 19, at 57-60; see also B. GAt.AWAY &J. HUDSON, OFFENDER RESTITUTION
IN THEORY AND ACTION 131-48 (1978); and Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Surve of its Past Histor , and an
Analysis of its Present Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 71 (1970). For a survey of the legislative reliance on
criminal restitution in criminal sentencing schemes, see supra note 6.
55 11 U.S.C. §§ 701 to 766 (1982). See, e.g., cases discussed infra notes 56-81 and accompanying
text.
56 See, e.g., In re Oslanger, 46 Bankr. 58 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984) (criminal restitution not dis-
chargeable); In re Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (criminal restitution not dis-
chargeable); In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981) (criminal restitution not
dischargeable).
But cf. In re Brown, 39 Bankr. 820 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (criminal restitution is a debt
dischargeable in bankruptcy); In re Newton, 15 Bankr. 708 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (certain forms of
criminal restitution are dischargeable).
57 See, e.g., In re Button, supra note 56, where the court looked to the relationship between crimi-
nal restitution and the victim of the crime. After reviewing the Bankruptcy Code's definitions of
"debt," "claim" and "creditor," the court concluded:
[lit does not appear that restitution could be considered a debt nor that a victim could be
considered a creditor, with restitution, the victim has no right to payment. It is the criminal
court which sets the restitution amount and if it is not paid the victim cannot proceed
against the debtor to enforce payment.
Id. at 694. In In re Magnifico, 21 Bankr. 800 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982), however, the court looked to the
purpose of the criminal restitution as it was used in that particular case to find that it was not dis-
chargeable. "[]'he underlying purpose of probationary criminal restitution under the facts of the
case is not one of simple debt servicing for victims but is in fact rehabilitative in nature. There is no
pre-petition, pre-existing debtor-creditor relationship between the State and the convicted felon."
Id. at 803 (emphasis in original).
But cf. In re Brown, supra note 56, where the court disregarded distinctions between civil and
criminal proceedings to find a sentence of criminal restitution subject to discharge. The court
stated:
If the Bankruptcy Code said that only orders to pay money by civil courts are debts for
bankruptcy purposes, then credence could be given to the defendant's argument that a
criminal court restitution order does not embody a "debt" dischargeable in bankruptcy.
However, nothing in the Bankruptcy Code suggests that only civil courts enter orders to
pay money that are subject to discharge in bankruptcy. A restitution order by a criminal
court no less acknowledges the existence of a debt than an order of a civil court reducing
that claim to judgment.
Id. at 822 (emphasis in original).
58 Chapter 7 discharge is explicitly limited to the "debts" of the debtor in § 727 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code:
(b) Except as provided in section 523 of this title, a discharge under subsection (a) of
this section discharges the debtorfriom all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief
II U.S.C. § 727(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1988) (emphasis added).
Chapter 13 is limited in the same way, see 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), which states in relevant part:
[Vol. 65:107
clusive analysis of the exceptions to discharge within the Bankruptcy
Code by finding that sentences of criminal restitution do not fall within
the scope of the definition of "debt."5 9 However, the reasoning used to
exclude criminal restitution from the Bankruptcy Code via the definition
of "debt" has not been uniform.60
Some courts argued on a different level that criminal restitution is
excluded from discharge under the specific exceptions to Chapter 7 dis-
charge. 6' Many of the courts concluding that criminal restitution is not a
debt also advanced this argument as an alternative rationale.62 Many of
these arguments were considered by the Supreme Court in Kelly v.
Robinson .63
In 1980, a Connecticut criminal court convicted Carolyn Robinson
of wrongfully receiving Public Assistance benefits. 64 Robinson was sub-
sequently sentenced to a five year term of probation, conditioned upon
her making restitution in monthly installments. 65 After making $450 in
restitution payments, she filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code. 66 The sentence of criminal restitution was listed in
that petition as a debt.67 After notifying the Connecticut agencies that
administered the restitution, and after receiving no objections from
them, the bankruptcy court granted Robinson a discharge of the restitu-
tion sentence. 68 Over two years later, the state probation office informed
Robinson of its belief that the sentence of restitution was not dischargea-
ble.69 Robinson then sought a declaration from the bankruptcy court
that the condition of restitution had been discharged, in addition to an
injunction preventing Connecticut from revoking her probation for non-
payment. 7
0
(a) As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under the
plan .... the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for ....
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1988) (emphasis added).
59 See, e.g., cases discussed supra note 56.
60 See, e.g., supra note 57.
61 Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code provides in relevant part:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does
not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the
benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other
than a tax penalty.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1988).
62 See, e.g., hi re Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984), where the court, after holding
that criminal restitution was not a "debt" under the Bankruptcy Code, went on to say:
[E]ven assuming arguendo that the state court order of restitution in this case is a debt
within the purview of the Bankruptcy Code, the result in this proceeding would not change
because such a debt would be expected [sic] from the discharge under Code § 523(a)(7).
Id. at 136.
63 479 U.S. 36 (1986), revg In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985) (which reversed In re
Robinson, 45 Bankr. 423 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984)).
64 In re Robinson, 776 F.2d at 31.
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The bankruptcy court denied all relief sought by Robinson, 7' relying
on its holding in In re Pellegrino.72 In Pellegrino, the court faced substan-
tially similar facts and concluded that criminal restitution was not a debt
subject to discharge. 73 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered
many of the arguments advanced by other courts. 74 In addition, the
court determined that criminal restitution would be excluded from dis-
charge by section 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code even if it were con-
sidered a debt.
75
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the
bankruptcy court in In re Robinson,76 holding that restitution was dis-
chargeable in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. 77 In reaching this result, the
court began by determining whether criminal restitution was a "debt" or
"claim" as those terms are defined in sections 101(4),(1 1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 78 The court noted that "Congress intended 'claim' to en-
compass any right held by any person or entity to enforce any money
obligation of the debtor. Thus .... Congress intended the term 'claim'
to have the broadest possible scope."' 79 In holding that sentences of
criminal restitution were within the broad definition of debt in the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the court rejected the Pellegrino line of cases.8 0 Once it was
determined that Robinson's restitution sentence was a debt, the court
found no exception in the Bankruptcy Code to exclude it from
discharge.8'
71 45 Bankr. 423, 425 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984).
72 42 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984). In Robinson, the bankruptcy court noted that "[t]he
facts in this proceeding, the issues raised, and the relief sought by the plaintiffare virtually identical
to those in In re Pellegrino .... Accordingly, the... legal conclusions reached in Pellegrino are adopted
to the facts here." 45 Bankr. at 424.
73 See id.
74 42 Bankr. at 132-35. See also supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
75 42 Bankr. at 136-38.
76 In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'g 45 Bankr. 423 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984).
77 776 F.2d at 41.
78 Id. at 33-38.
79 Id. at 35. A "claim" is an integral aspect of a "debt" in the scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.
As the court noted:
[B]y giving "claim" the broadest possible definition and defining "debt" in terms of a
"claim," Congress also sought to give the term "debt" its broadest possible scope. Thus,
the congressional reports accompanying [section 101 (11)] stated that the concepts of debt
and claim were "coextensive: a creditor has a 'claim' against a debtor; the debtor owes a
'debt' to the creditor."
Id. at 36 (quoting 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEvs 5787, 5809).
80 Id. at 36. The court concluded:
[W]e see no support.., for the view adopted by the Pellegrio line of cases that unless the
victim of the crime has a right of payment, a criminal restitution obligation is not a debt
within the meaning of the Code. We think the interpretation that more faithfully reflects
Congress's intent is the one we adopt here: that any right to the payment of restitution is a
claim within the meaning of the Code; and that if any person or entity has a right to receive
a payment of restitution from the bankrupt debtor, the obligor has a debt within the mean-
ing of the Code.
Id.
81 Id. at 39-41. The court denied that § 523(a)(7) would exclude criminal restitution from dis-
charge. Although the court admitted that Robinson's sentence of restitution was clearly a "penalty"
"payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit," II U.S.C. § 523(a)(7), it found that the
sentence was compensatory and thus not to be excluded:
[A] debt that has compensation for actual pecuniary loss as at least one of its purposes is
not, to the extent that it does not exceed the amount of the loss, excepted from discharge
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In Kelly v. Robinson,82 the Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Second Circuit, holding that criminal restitution is excluded from dis-
charge by section 523(a) (7) of the Bankruptcy Code.83 The Court began
its analysis with an examination of the treatment of state criminal
sentences under the former Bankruptcy Act,84 concluding that "Con-
gress enacted the Code . . .against the background of an established
judicial exception to discharge for criminal sentences, including restitu-
tion orders, an exception created in the face of a statute drafted with
considerable care and specificity." 85 The Court also noted its "deep con-
viction that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of
state criminal proceedings." 86 In addition, the Court expressed concern
over the practical effects of the Second Circuit's determination that crim-
inal restitution is a "debt" for Bankruptcy Code purposes. 87
Notwithstanding its many criticisms of the appellate court's determi-
nation that restitution is a "debt," the Court declined to base its holding
on a definition-of-debt analysis. 88 Instead, the Court found that criminal
restitution fell within the specific exception of Chapter 7 discharge for
fines, penalties and forfeitures. 89 In confining its analysis to the specific
exceptions to Chapter 7 discharge, the Court limited its holding to the
dischargeability of criminal restitution in Chapter 7.90 As Justice Mar-
shall pointed out in his dissent, "[t]he Court's solution only postpones
the problem: its holding that the restitution obligation is nondischarge-
able under section 523(a)(7) leaves open the possibility that such obliga-
by § 523(a)(7). Given the facts that the Connecticut statutory scheme allows the criminal
restitution obligation to be fixed with reference to "the loss or damage caused (by the of-
fense)," that the order here fixed Robinson's debt at precisely the amount she had wrong-
fully received... we conclude that Robinson's debt cannot be classified as one that is "not
compensation for actual pecuniary loss."
Id. at 40-41.
82 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
83 Id. at 50-52.
84 Id. at 44.
85 Id. at 46. But see Ballam, supra note 47, at 122.
86 479 U.S. at 47.
87 Id. at 48-49. The Court worried that to hold criminal restitution subject to bankruptcy dis-
charge would "create uncertainties and impose undue burdens on state officials. In some cases it
would require state prosecutors to defend particular state criminal judgments before federal bank-
ruptcy courts." Id. at 48. In addition, such a result "would hamper the flexibility of state criminal
judges in choosing the combination of imprisonment, fines, and restitution most likely to further the
rehabilitative and deterrent goals of state criminal justice systems." Id. at 49.
88 See id. at 50, where Justice Powell wrote for the Court:
In light of the established state of the law-that bankruptcy courts could not discharge
criminal judgments-we have serious doubts whether Congress intended to make criminal
penalties "debts" within the meaning of§ 10 1(4). But we need not address that question in
this case, because we hold § 523(a)(7) preserves from discharge any condition a state crimi-
nal court imposes as part of a criminal sentence.
Id. (citation omitted).
89 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7), which states that debts are dischargeable:
to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a
governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.
Id.
90 The more expansive discharge allowed under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is not lim-
ited by the exception to discharge upon which the Court based its decision in Robinson. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1328(a). See also infra note 95 and accompanying text.
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tions will be dischargeable under Chapter 13."91 The issue is still very
much alive in Chapter 13 cases because, in confining its analysis to the
specific exception to discharge, the Court sub silentio accepted that crimi-
nal restitution fell within the Bankruptcy Code's definition of debt.
9 2
The Court's holding created even greater confusion among courts and
commentators. 93 Much of this confusion is manifested in cases involving
criminal restitution under Chapter 13.
2. Criminal Restitution in Bankruptcy After Kelly v. Robinson
Because the Court in Kelly v. Robinson limited its holding to Chapter
7 discharge attempts,9 4 the issue of the dischargeability of criminal resti-
tution remains alive in Chapter 13.95 Since Robinson, there have been
many cases involving attempts by Chapter 13 debtors to discharge
sentences of criminal restitution. 96 In deciding the issue in the Chapter
13 discharge context, many courts have concluded that Robinson is not
applicable to Chapter 13 cases. 97 In reaching this conclusion, Courts
have replicated the debate which surrounded the dischargeability of res-
titution in Chapter 7.
In In re Heincy,98 for example, a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the
Ninth Circuit held that certain criminal restitution sentences are dis-
chargeable in Chapter 13.99 The California statute under which the resti-
tution order was imposed in that case stated that "[a] restitution fine
shall be deemed a debt for the purposes of [California] Government
Code, excepting any amounts the defendant has paid to the victim as a
result of the crime."10 0 Based on that language, and a belief that to alter
the broad interpretation of "debt" and "claim" in the Bankruptcy Code
91 479 U.S. at 59 n.6 (Marshall,J, dissenting). Justice Marshall would have affirmed "the judg-
ment and permit[ted] Congress, if it were so inclined, to amend the Bankruptcy Code specifically to
make criminal restitution obligations nondischargeable." Id. at 58-59.
92 Section 523 excludes debts which would otherwise be dischargeable from discharge. Before
§ 523(a)(7) would enter the analysis, therefore, a court must take an explicit or implicit step finding
that criminal restitution is a debt.
93 See, e.g., cases discussed infra notes 94-125 and accompanying text. See also Ballam, supra note
47; and Hennigan, Crimtinal Restitution and Banknuptcy Law in the Federal System, 19 CONN. L. REX'. 89
(1986).
94 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
95 See infra notes 96, 120. Chapter 13 discharge is more expansive than that afforded by Chapter
7. Section 1328(a) incorporates only one of the § 523(a) exclusions in Chapter 13 discharge. See II
U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2). But cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c)(2), where all the § 523(a) exclusions apply under
special circumstances.
96 See, e.g., In re Heincy, 78 Bankr. 246 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987); In re Kohr, 82 Bankr. 706 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1988); Davenport v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare (In re Davenport), 89 Bankr. 428
(E.D. Pa. 1988); Penn. Dep't of Public Welfare v.Johnson-Allen (In re johnson-Allen), 88 Bankr. 659
(E.D. Pa. 1988); Becker v. Sacramento County (In re Hackney), 83 Bankr. 20 (Bankr. N.D. Ca. 1988).
97 See, e.g., In re Heincy, 78 Bankr. at 249 (holding "that Kelly v. Robinson does not extend to a
Chapter 13 proceeding"); and In re Cullens, 77 Bankr. 825 (Bankr. D. Col. 1987) (Robinson not
determinative of Chapter 13 cases). See also In re Johnson-Allen, 871 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1989).
98 78 Bankr. 246 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987).
99 Id. at 249. In determining what criminal restitution sentences could be discharged in Chapter
13, the court stated that "[tihe wording of the restitution statute has an effect on whether the restitu-
tion order creates a 'right to payment.' " Id. at 248 (relying on Marshall's dissent in Robinson, 479
U.S. at 36 n.4).
100 78 Bankr. at 248.
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would require legislative guidance, the court deferred to Congress.' 0 ' In
effect, Kelly v. Robinson had an impact on the court's decision in Heincy. 10 2
In-In re Cancel, '03 the Bankruptcy Court considered Robinson and saw
"no reason why the same result of nondischargeability should not obtain
in the present chapter 13 proceeding [i.e.,] that a criminal restitution ob-
ligation is not a 'debt' within the meaning of the Code."' 0 4 The Bank-
ruptcy Court distinguished criminal restitution from other debts by
looking to the nature of each. 10 5 On appeal, 0 6 however, the District
Court rejected the holding of the Bankruptcy Court, 10 7 relying instead
on the Second Circuit opinion in In re Robinson.108 Because the Supreme
Court declined to rule on the question of whether criminal restitution is a
"debt,"' 1 9 the District Court in Cancel concluded that the holding of the
Second Circuit was still binding precedent. °
Other courts, however, have followed the spirit of Robinson in the
Chapter 13 context."' In In re Kohr,112 for example, the court concluded
101 Id. The court stated:
Very strong evidence of explicit language from the legislative history is necessary to over-
come the plain meaning naturally to be drawn from the language of a statute .... On their
face the definitions of "claim" and "debt" ... encompass a restitution payment, and there is
no legislative history which would suggest exclusion of restitution payments from these
definitions.
Id. The court was unwilling to consider the fundamental policies and goals embodied by bankruptcy
law as against criminal sentencing.
102 The court in Heincy stated:
We recognize that the result, based upon Kelly v. Robinson, would be different in a Chapter
7, an individual Chapter 11, or a Chapter 12 bankruptcy case because § 523(a)(7) would
apply in these cases to a debt of restitution. However, we hold that Kelly v. Robinson does
not extend to a Chapter 13 proceeding.
78 Bankr. at 249.
103 82 Bankr. 674 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.), revd 85 Bankr 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); see infra note 107.
104 82 Bankr. at 676.
105 See id. The court also compared the functions of bankruptcy courts and criminal courts:
[T]his court does not agree that the 'fresh start' concept is violated by holding that criminal
restitution payments are not embraced by discharge. The bankruptcy and criminal courts
are dissimilar in nature and function. It should be noted that in carrying out a dual function
to punish as well as rehabilitate its offenders, the criminal court... determines the amount
of restitution to be paid with reference to what it deems the defendant can afford to pay
* It is, therefore, uniquely distinct from a civil money judgment which is imposed with
reference to the law of damages.
Id.
106 Cancel v. City of Schenectady (li re Cancel), 85 Bankr. 677 (N.D.N.Y.), re, ' 82 Bankr. 674
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988).
107 See 85 Bankr. at 678. The District Court reversed the Bankruptcy Court, not based on the
merits of the lower court's argument, but rather on the weight of prior precedent expressed by the
Second Circuit.
108 In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30, 33-39 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, sub nora. Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
109 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
110 See 85 Bankr. at 679, where the court stated:
While the Supreme Court expressed "serious doubts" about the Second Circuit's con-
clusion that restitution constituted a debt within the meaning of the Code, it declined to
reverse on that ground. Accordingly, that portion of the Second Circuit opinion in Robinson
which concluded that restitution is a debt is still good law in this Circuit. No matter how
well reasoned [the bankruptcy court's] decision is, the court is constrained to reverse it on
the authority of In re Robinson.
Id.
111 See, e.g., It re Norman, 95 Bankr. 771 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); In re Ferris, 93 Bankr. 729
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); In reJohnson, 32 Bankr. 614 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
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that criminal restitution could not be dischargeable in Chapter 13
cases."t 3 The court based this conclusion on a definition-of-debt analysis
utilyzing the Robinson Court's references to deference to state criminal
law 1 4 and federalism." 15 In In re Davenport," 6 the court concluded that
criminal restitution could not be discharged in Chapter 13 cases.' '7 The
court in Davenport also placed great weight on "important policies of fed-
eralism.,"1 In addition to federalism concerns, the court looked to the
possibility of chilling effects on state criminal sentencing discretion." 19
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
the District Court's holding, choosing instead to adopt the reasoning em-
ployed by the Ninth Circuit in In re Heincy.120
The scope of the conflict between criminal restitution and the Bank-
ruptcy Code extends beyond discharge.' 2 1 In In re Hackeny, 12 2 for exam-
ple, the court determined that a debtor-creditor relationship existed
between the debtor and the county receiving the restitution payments.1
23
112 82 Bankr. 706 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
113 Id. at 712.
114 Id. at 709.
115 Id. at 710-11. The court criticized Heinc , for:
fail[ing] to address the federalism rationale which was held to be paramount by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Kelly. The principle of federalism as it concerns insulation of-the results
of state criminal proceedings" from a bankruptcy discharge should be no less applicable in
Chapter 13 than it is in Chapter 7.
Id. at 711 (quoting In re Hein., 78 Bankr. at 251).
116 Davenport v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep't of Public Welfare (In re Davenport), 89
Bankr. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1988), rev'd sub nom. In re Johnson-Allen, 871 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1989).
117 Id. at 429.
118 Id. The court looked to the nature of the criminal restitution sentence to determine its place
and importance in the federalism scheme:
Allowing a federal bankruptcy court to discharge a financial obligation imposed by a
state court as an alternative punishment for crime would conflict with important policies of
federalism .... The decision to impose a particular punishment involves a weighing of
various goals of the state criminal justice system .... Sometimes the particular punishment
(e.g., restitution payments to the victim of the crime) will have a concommitant private bene-
fit for the victim of the crime. Despite this private benefit, criminal restitution benefits.
unlike civil obligations, involve vindication of fundamental public interests.
Id. (citations omitted). See also infra notes 215-224 and accompanying text.
119 The court noted:
If a criminal restitution obligation can be discharged by filing a Chapter 13 petition,
courts would be reluctant to impose restitution as a criminal penalty and might opt for
periods of incarceration instead. It is essential that state courts are able to impose penal
sanctions other than incarceration without fear that a federal court will render this punish-
ment nugatory after the fact.
Id. at 430. See also infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
120 In reJohnson-Allen, et. al., 871 F.2d 421, 423 (3d Cir. 1989), rev' InI re Davenport, 89 Bankr.
428 (E.D. Pa. 1988). In addition to adopting the reasoning oftleinc, the Third Circuit placed weight
on the Second Circuit's holding in In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985), and on the Supreme
Court's refusal to base its decision in Kelly v. Robinson on a definition-of-debt analysis. SeeJohnson-
Allen, 871 F.2d at 425-26. Thus, the Courts of Appeal for the Second, Third and Ninth Circuits have
held sentences of criminal restitution dischargeable in Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
121 Once a court defines debt to include criminal restitution, then the other processes of the
Bankruptcy Code will also interact with the restitutive sentence.
122 83 Bankr. 20 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1988).
123 Id. at 21-22. The holding in Hackney follows directly from the holding in In re Heiny, supra
note 96. The court in Hackney stated:
[T]he Court need not decide the question which the Supreme Court declined to decide, i.e.,
whether a restitution obligation is a "debt", because in In re Heincy, [supra note 96], the
Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel expressly held that a restitution obligation is a
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This determination had important consequences in terms of the Bank-
ruptcy Code's provisions on voidable preferences.1 24 The court in Hack-
ney downplayed any effect on the state criminal justice system caused by
compelling the county to surrender restitution payments made within the
preference period. 1
25
In viewing cases decided in the aftermath of Robinson, the relation of
criminal restitution to bankruptcy law is no less in need of resolution
than before the Supreme Court undertook to resolve the conflict. Courts
need to employ a clear, consistent rationale in order to reach a uniform
and fundamentally sound determination of the proper scope of the Bank-
ruptcy Code as it interacts with areas of state substantive law like criminal
sentencing. This rationale must be based on a recognition of the funda-
mental goals and policies of the law involved when the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code do not clearly preempt the state law.
II. Returning to Fundamentals
When a conflict arises between the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code and state law, in the absence of express statutory provisions di-
rectly addressing the conflict,' 26 courts should begin their analysis with a
contextual examination of the language of the Bankruptcy Code and its
legislative history.' 27 In the conflict over the dischargeability of criminal
"debt" within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code Section 101 (11) (and thus, the remaining
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including Section 547(a)(2)).
83 Bankr. at 23. See also supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
124 Section 547(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any
transfer of an interest of the debtor in the property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (emphasis added). Once it is determined that a debtor-creditor relationship
exists between the state and the restitutioner, the trustee in bankruptcy may avoid any payments
made by the restitutioner to the state within the 90-day preference period. Thus, the bankruptcy
court can actually order a state, and perhaps even the victim, to return any payments so made.
125 Id. at 24. The court noted:
The County argues that if the transfer at issue is avoided, such avoidance would consti-
tute a modification of a criminal sentence imposed by the State Court. It is true that a
judgment which compels the County to surrender a preference may deprive it of the benefit
which the State Court intended it to-receive .... It is also true, however, that although
California's restitution provisions may serve both a compensatory and punitive function,
the County focused on the compensatory aspect by seeking to enforce its right to receive
restitution through a normal civil collection proceeding and not through the criminal
proceeding.
Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, instead of looking to the nature of the criminal sentence involved, the
court chose to confine itself to the method of collection utilized by the victim and the state.
126 When there are express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code which directly address potential
conflicts with state law, the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code clearly must prevail. See, e.g., Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), discussed inra notes 219-223 and accompanying text. See also, e.g.,
§ 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, which excepts from Chapter 7 discharge any debt:
(8) for an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or
made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit
institution ....
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). Thus, state and federal guaranteed student loans are not dischargeable in
Chapter 7, while they are dischargeable in Chapter 13, regardless of what the state statute authoriz-
ing the loans may read.
127 On the need to extend the interpretation of statutory provisions beyond the "plain meaning"
and face of the statute to syntactical and contextual considerations, see generally J. CUERTO-RUA,
JUDICAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW (1981), where the author states:
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restitution, the language of the Bankruptcy Code provides no help. 128
When one examines the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, the
ambiguity over the dischargeability of criminal restitution becomes even
greater. 129 Thus, to resolve the conflict, courts should employ a careful
analysis of the "first principles" and fundamental values which the con-
flicting areas of law represent.130
One reason for extending the analysis to the "first principles" is that
federal bankruptcy law flows from the Bankruptcy Clause of the Consti-
tution.' 3 1 As with any grant of power to Congress, the bankruptcy power
Utterances such as those commonly found in written legal materials ... very seldom
constitute by themselves a complete judicial norm-a rule of law. They are only a part of
that norm. An appropriate understanding of an utterance demands linkage between that
utterance and the complete rule of law. The complete rule of law is itself only part of a
larger linguistic-normative context in which juridical utterances ought to be interpreted.
Id. at 106. Thus, the scope of the Bankruptcy Code should not be determined in the vacuum of the
statutory text. Reference must also be had to the foundations of bankruptcy law which provide a
context, as well as the background provided by all other jurisprudential rules beyond bankruptcy
law, such as the jurisprudential foundations of state criminal law. See also R. DICKERSON, TIlE INTER-
PRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975); J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES (198 1); Frank-
furter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947).
128 The only area of the Bankruptcy Code which explicitly deals with the relation of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to criminal law is the exceptions to the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1). See
also infra note 237. The definitions of "debt" and "claim," II U.S.C. §§ 101(4),(l 1), are broad on
their face, with no limiting language. See supra note 28. In addition, the exceptions to discharge
never refer to criminal sentences. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
129 As discussed earlier, the Bankruptcy Code's definitions of "debt" and "claim" act as the entry
point into the statute's operations. See supra notes 28, 57-58. The House Report's discussion of the
definition of "claim" expressed a legislative intent to enlarge the availability of bankruptcy relief:
The effect of the definition [of "claim"] is a significant departure from present law .... The
term is defined in the debtor rehabilitation chapters of present law far more broadly [than
under the former Bankruptcy Act]. The definition in [I 1 U.S.C. § 10 1(4)] adopts an even
broader definition of claim than is found in the present debtor rehabilitation chapters ....
By this broadest possible definition ... the bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the
debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy
case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 6266. Despite the sweeping language of the House Report, there is important limiting
language at the end of the passage. The House Report limits its definition of "claim" to "permiti I
the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court." Id. (emphasis added). What is "possible" in the
bankruptcy court is defined by the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause and hence the nature of bank-
ruptcy law generally. There is a need to resort to the "first principles" because the legislative history
of the Bankruptcy Code does not define what is "possible." Thus, the ambiguity inherent in the
Bankruptcy Code's definition of "claim" prevents resolution of the conflict merely through a reading
of the language and legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code. Indeed, it is the circular reasoning
inherent in that definition which necessitates recourse to the "first principles" of bankruptcy law.
130 See T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 2-3 (1986) [hereinafter JACKSON,
LOGIC AND LIMITS], where Professor Jackson states:
In analyzing bankruptcy law, as with any other body of law, it helps to start by identify-
ingfirst principles. Those principles can then be developed by defining their potential opera-
tion in the existing social, economic, and legal world to identify precisely what bankruptcy
law should encompass, how it can accomplish its goals, and the constraints on its ability to
do so. That normative view of bankruptcy law can then be contrasted with the Bankruptcy
Code as enacted to see whether and to what extent the existing regime follows the path the
principles suggest is the proper one.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
See also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 41 (1832), which states that "the most universal and
effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering
the reason and spirit of it." Id. (emphasis in original).
131 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 4, which grants Congress the power "[t]o establish ... uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
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must have some limits. Those limits are set by the very nature of bank-
ruptcy law and its position in jurisprudence historically. By defining the
nature and scope of bankruptcy law, certain limits to the bankruptcy
power of Congress emerge. Delineating the scope of the Bankruptcy
Clause and bankruptcy law in general will help define the proper scope
of the Bankruptcy Code.13 2 Judicial definition of the scope of the Bank-
ruptcy Code has often determined what independent areas of law must
fall by the wayside. Such definition of scope was crucial when the Bank-
ruptcy Code conflicted with state subordination powers, 33 state family
law,' 3 4 state and federal environmental law,' 35 state property law,' 3 6 in-
132 That is not to say that limitations found in the Bankruptcy Clause would be absolute; rather,
when Congress purports to act pursuant to the bankruptcy power, it must abide by those limits.
Congress may well have other powers that would support such action outside the scope of the Bank-
ruptcy Clause. Nevertheless, when Congress purports to act pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause,
such legislation should be interpreted as if intended by Congress to be within the limits of the
proper scope of the Bankruptcy Clause.
133 See, e.g., Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1953), which examines
conflicts between the equity powers of bankruptcy courts under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and
state-created rights in relation to questions of disallowance and subordination. The author states
that "[bleyond the apparent purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to provide a system for the effectuation
of what are for the most part state-created rights, the Act provides little guidance as to the recogni-
tion to be accorded state law." Id. at 1035. Hill goes on to cite "cases where substantive rights
asserted under state law were denied or modified in the name of 'general law' or 'general equitable
principles.' " Id.; for those cases, see id. nn.93-94.
134 See Note, Pension Awards in Divorce and Bankruptcy, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 194 (1988) (examining
the dischargeability of property awards in a divorce such as pension or retirement benefits); see also
White, Strange Bedfellows: The Uneasy Alliance Between Bankruptcy and Family Law, 17 N.M.L. REV. I
(1987); and Note, Bankrnptcy Discharge of Texas Marital Property Awards under Section 523(a)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code: Rethinking In re Nunnally, 41 S.W.L.J. 869 (1987).
, See also, e.g., lI re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975); Matter of Benich, 811 F.2d 943 (5th
Cir. 1987); and it re Meadows, 75 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (involving the nondis-
chargeability of attorneys' fees awarded with an award of child support).
135 State and federal environmental protection statutes have conflicted with the operations of the
bankruptcy trustee's abandonment powers under I 1 U.S.C. § 554, and the trustee's avoiding powers
under I 1 U.S.C. §§ 545 & 546. State and federal environmental statutes contain provisions for envi-
ronmental liens on contaminated property which can be enforceable against intervening bona fide
purchasers. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Conmpensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. IV 1988); see also Epling, Environmental Liens in Bankruptcy, 44
Bus. LAWYER 85 (1988), where the author surveys the interaction of state and federal environmental
"superliens" with the powers of the trustee under the Bankruptcy Code. The U.S. Supreme Court
has dealt with the relation of state environmental liens to the Bankruptcy Code in Ohio v. Kovacs,
469 U.S. 274 (1985), and Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Environmental Protection,
474 U.S. 494 (1986). In Midlantic, the Court stated: "[n]either the Court nor Congress has granted a
trustee in bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to abandon property in contraven-
tion of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety." 474 .U.S. at 502. Notwith-
standing the Supreme Court pronouncements on the relation of state and federal environmental law
to bankruptcy law, there remains much debate among commentators. See generally Epling, supra;
Shanker, A Bankruptcy Supetfiind for Some Super Creditors - From Ohio to .lfidlantic and Beyond, 61 AM.
BANER. L.J. 185 (1987); Comment, Ohio v. Kovacs: The Conflict Between Federal Bankruptcy Laws and
State Environmental Regulations, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1263 (1987); Comment, Ohio v. Kovacs, and Penn
Terra: The Bankruptcy Code and State Environmental Law - Perceived Conflicts and Options for the Tustee and
State Environmental Agencies, 7 J.L. & COM. 65 (1987).
136 Trustees in bankruptcy have sought to have the bankruptcy court avoid mortgage foreclosure
sales as constructively fraudulent transfers as defined in section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. Fore-
closures are governed by state property law and have traditionally been considered outside the defi-
nition of a transfer in bankruptcy law. Recently, however, courts found such foreclosures to
constitute transfers within section 548. Consequently, the trustee may'avoid the foreclosure gov-
erned by state law as a constructively fraudulent transfer when made for insufficient consideration.
There is a split among the Circuits as to the applicability of section 548 to such foreclosure sales.
See, e.g., Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that a non-
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surance law,' 37 labor law,s38 and other areas of state law. 13 9 Courts must
arrive at a uniform and coherent methodology for delineating the proper
collusive, regularly conducted foreclosure sale [i.e., in compliance with state law] is a fraudulent
transfer under section 67(d) of the former Bankruptcy Act if not made for "fair consideration"); see
also Matter of Bundles, 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988) (following Durrett, supra); but see In re Madrid, 21
Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984) (declining to
follow Dunell). See also Alden, Gross & Borowitz, Real Properly Foreclosure as Fraudulent Conveyance:
Proposals for Solving the Durrell Problem, 38 Bus. LAWYER 1605 (1983); and Zinman, Houle & Weiss,
Fraudulent Transfers According to Alden, Gross and Borowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAWYER 977
(1984).
The conflict with state common law and statutory provisions governing foreclosure sales is
analogous to the conflict over the dischargeability of criminal restitution. Against the backdrop of
non-interference with state foreclosure proceedings, bankruptcy courts have expanded the definition
of a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code to encompass foreclosure sales. Similarly, against a back-
drop of non-interference with state criminal law, bankruptcy courts have expanded the scope of the
definition of debt to encompass sentences of criminal restitution. Just as with the conflict over at-
tempts to discharge criminal restitution, bankruptcy courts have not consulted the underlying poli-
cies when determining whether a foreclosure sale is a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. In
addition, courts will often rest on tortured legal reasoning in order to avoid ruling on the conflict at
all. See, e.g., Butler v. Lomas and Nettleton Co., 862 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1988), where the court
reasoned that the technicalities of the sheriff's sale involved placed any transfer that could have
taken place outside of the one-year preference period. See id. at 1019.
137 Many bankruptcy courts, broadly construing the Bankruptcy Code's definition of the property
of the debtor's estate, have determined that a debtor's liability insurance policies fall within that
definition and are to be treated as property of the estate. See, e.g., A.H. Robbins Co. v. Piccinin, 788
F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986). Some of the consequences of this conclusion
may be seen in MacArthur Co. v.Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988). MacArthur was
a distributor of Manville's asbestos products, and a coinsured under some of Manville's insurance
policies by "vendor endorsements" contained in the policies. The Bankruptcy Court ordered an
automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code to enjoin claims by asbestos victims against Manville's
insurers. In addition, the court approved a settlement between asbestos-injured claimants and the
insurers. MacArthur argued that "the injunctive orders constitute[d] a defacto discharge in bank-
ruptcy of non-debtor parties not entitled to the protection of Chapter 11." 837 F.2d at 91. By
expanding the definition of property of the estate under the Bankruptcy Code, the court exercised
jurisdiction over a non-debtor's contractual rights which were separate from those of the debtor in
bankruptcy. It is unclear just how expansive the definition of property of the estate will prove to be
in the future. In .1lacArthur, the scope was broad enough to allow jurisdiction over the contractual
rights of a non-debtor coinsured which would normally be governed and defined by state law. For a
discussion of the expanding definition of property in the Bankruptcy Code, see generally Dunham,
Pensions and Other Funds in Individual Bankrupty Cases, 4 BANKR. DEV. J. 293 (1987).
138 Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the trustee, under certain restrictions,
and subject to the bankruptcy court's approval, "may assume or reject any executory contract" of the
debtor. Collective-bargaining agreements, included in the term "executory contract," have been set
aside by trustees in bankruptcy with the approval of the court. The conflict with federal labor law
arose when the National Labor Relations Board attempted to hold the trustee accountable under the
National Labor Relations Act for unilaterally changing the terms of collective-bargaining agree-
ments. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1973 & Supp. IV 1988).
In National Labor Relations Bd. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), the Supreme Court
resolved the conflict by holding that:
[Tihe language "executory contract" in § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(a) (1982 ed.), includes within it collective-bargaining agreements subject to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, and that the Bankruptcy Court may approve rejection of such
contracts by the debtor-in-possession upon appropriate showing. We also decide that a
debtor-in-possession does not commit unfair labor practice when, after filing a bankruptcy
petition but before court-approved rejection of the collective-bargaining agreement, it uni-
laterally modifies or terminates one or more provisions of the agreement.
id. at 516-17.
See also, Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11
Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293 (1983); Miller, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act and Collective Bargaining
.-greements: The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements n'der the Bankruptcy Code - An Abuse or Proper
Exeicise of the Congressional Bankruptcy Power?, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1120 (1984); and Wines, The Long
.1Iarch to Bildisco and the 1984 Bankruptcy .- mendments: Establishment of a Limited Right to Reject Collective
Bargaining Agreements, 20 GoNz. L. REV. 187 (1984).
[Vol. 65:107
scope of the Bankruptcy Code as it interacts with these other areas of
state and federal law.
A. Foundations of Bankruptcy Law and Criminal Restitution
Where, as here, the statutory language and legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code do not resolve a conflict with another area of law, one
can arrive at a consistent and predictable solution by first defining the
"first principles" of the area of bankruptcy law involved, and then by
relating these to the "first principles" of the independent area of law
which the Bankruptcy Code purports to supersede.
1. "First Principles" of Bankruptcy Law-
The "first principles" of bankruptcy law are the product of a long
evolution which began long before a mature federal law of bankruptcy
was developed. 140 One cornerstone of bankruptcy law since its origin in
Roman law has been that it is ultimately debt-collection law.' 4' Over
time however, a dual purpose has developed. The dual goals of bank-
ruptcy law today are to provide a fair and final distribution. and settle-
ment of the debtor's assets among his creditors, 42 and to provide
individual debtors with a "fresh start" financially.1 43 Debtor relief aimed
at providing a "fresh start" has become increasingly prominent in bank-
139 See, e.g., Note, The Bankruptcy Trustee's Power to Waive the Attorney-Client Privilege of a Corporate
Debtor. A New Approach, 2 BANKR. DEv. J. 221 (1985).
140 See generally 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 0.01-0.07 (14th ed. 1974), where the author re-
views the history and development of bankruptcy law in America from the Articles of Confederation
through the Bankruptcy Act amendments of 1938. The lack of uniformity among state bankruptcy
laws early on shows that:
[t]he main inadequacy of the state insolvency laws ... was the inability to give a discharge
which would be effective in other states.
It was inevitable that Congress would be called upon to exercise its legislative power
over the subject of bankruptcies. An expanding commercial union would require it; finan-
cial stringency would accelerate the demand. This latter element has been the culminating
factor in producing the Acts of 1800, 1941, 1867 and 1898.
Id. at T 0.03, p. 7. The first long-term attempt to establish a uniform and permanent federal law of
bankruptcy came in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544, as amendedby Bankruptcy Act amend-
ments of 1938 (Chandler Act), 52 Stat. 840.
141 See, F. NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAw 10-32 (1919), where the author surveys the
history of bankruptcy law beginning in ancient Greek and Roman law and going through the provi-
sion in the U.S. Constitution granting Congress the bankruptcy power. Cf D. EARL, THE BANKRUP-
TIAN$ § 43-53 (1966) (tracing the history of bankruptcy law back to the Code of Hammurabi and the
Bible).
142 See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM (1971), where the au-
thors observe:
The bankruptcy process was established to resolve in a fair and orderly manner the conflicts
in interest that arise among the creditors of a debtor who cannot pay his debts. Other legal
remedies are available that enable creditors to attempt to recover their claims from the
property of the debtor; but if that remedy is too meager to pay all claims in full, one credi-
tor's success in satisfying his claim causes loss to another creditor.
Id. at 9 (footnote omitted). The authors conclude that "[tihe object of the bankruptcy law is to
ensure that all creditors are treated fairly." Id. at 9-10.
143 See id. at 10, where the authors note the shift in emphasis in bankruptcy law from primarily
one of seeking fair settlement and distribution among creditors, toward a concurrent emphasis on
relief of the debtor:
For centuries bankruptcy law served [the objective of seeking a fair distribution] above
all other [objectives]. At the end of the nineteenth century, however, another object be-
came equally important in the United States. The bankruptcy process became also a
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ruptcy law. The increased reliance on this "first principle" of bankruptcy
law is partly due to the rapid rise of consumer debt in this century. 144 In
response to the increase in consumer debt and the consequent incidence
of consumer insolvency, 145 Congress amended the former Bankruptcy
Act 146 in order to give "honest but unfortunate" individual debtors a
"fresh start" financially.' 47 Although the concept is a recent addition to
bankruptcy law, it has become an overriding goal for many courts and
commentators. 1
48
The scope of "fresh start" embodied in the Bankruptcy Code 149
greatly expanded the availability of a "fresh start" under the provisions
of the former Bankruptcy Act. 150 The policy is primarily embodied in the
discharge, 15  automatic stay, 15 2 and permanent injunction 5 provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code. 154 The goal of providing individual debtors
with a fresh start has been at the core of arguments in favor of discharg-
method of granting relief to the honest but unfortunate debtor, who through ill luck or bad
judgment was burdened with more debt than he could afford.
Id.
144 See, e.g., id. at 18-40, where Professors Stanley and Girth survey the interrelation of the in-
crease of personal bankruptcies, personal debt, and debt-income ratio between 1945 and 1970.
145 See supra note 53.
146 The House Report concerning the implementation of the Bankruptcy Code stated:
A major problem under current bankruptcy law is the inadequacy of relief that the Bank-
ruptcy Act provides for consumer debtors.... In the post-War years, consumer credit has
become a major industry, and buying on time has become a way of life for a large segment
of the population. The bankruptcy rate among consumers has risen accordingly, but with-
out the required provisions in the Bankruptcy Act to protect those who need bankruptcy
relief. This bill makes bankruptcy a more effective remedy for the unfortunate consumer
debtor.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 5963, 5965-66.
147 See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934), where the Court first enunciated the policy
of debtor relief as a primary purpose of bankruptcy law:
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to "relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."..... This purpose
of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being a public as well as
private interest, in that it gives the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distri-
bution any property which he owns at the time ofbankrup-', a new opportunity in life and a
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting
debt.
Id. at 244 (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fidelity Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)) (emphasis in original).
148 See, e.g., Ballam, supra note 47; Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher Start, 58
N.C.L. REV. 723 (1980).
149 See the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, as codifiedat 11 U.S.C. §§ 727 and 1328
(1982 & Supp. IV 1988).
150 "Fresh start" policy was embodied in the discharge provisions of the former Bankruptcy Act.
See §§ 14-17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 550-51 (1898), as amended by §§ 14-17 of the Bankruptcy
Act amendments, 52 Stat. 850-51 (1938).
151 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727 and 1328.
152 See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
153 See supra note 40.
154 Another manifestation of the "fresh start" concept may be found in provisions which exempt
parts of the debtor's property from liquidation in Chapter 7, see 11 U.S.C. § 522, as well as in the
provisions concerning "non-disposable income" in Chapter 13 plans which is protected from credi-
tors in order to support debtors in their new life. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b). See also manifesta-
tions of "fresh start" policy in other areas of law, discussed infra notes 168-173 and accompanying
text. In addition to "fresh start" policy, the policy of a fair and final distribution among creditors
may also influence the proper scope of discharge. See Kelly v. Robinson, supra note 82, at 57-58 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
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ing criminal restitution, 15 5 even though such arguments do not expressly
state their reliance on the goal. 156 In considering whether discharging
criminal restitution is an appropriate application of bankruptcy law, it is
necessary to first consider the appropriate weight to be given "fresh
start" as a goal in bankruptcy.
Although "fresh start" exists concurrently with the debt-collection
and distribution function of bankruptcy law, 157 the two goals do not al-
ways coexist peacefully. The social and economic policy determinations
represented in "fresh start" policy are distinct from those underlying the
debt-collection function.' 58 Despite the inherent tension between the
two goals, they are necessarily interrelated and interdependent in bank-
ruptcy law.' 5 9 "Fresh start" as a goal is debtor-oriented, 60 while the
goal of equitable distribution and settlement of assets and debts is credi-
tor-oriented.' 6 ' Congress' balance between debtor and creditor inter-
ests in bankruptcy appears in the discharge and automatic stay provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code. 162 Thus, the Bankruptcy Code's provisions giv-
ing discharges to individual debtors embody the "fresh start" policy.' 63
155 Sentences of criminal restitution, if determined to survive discharge, would clearly impair to
some extent the debtor's future financial life. By arguing in favor of discharging criminal restitution,
one necessarily argues for an expanded scope of "fresh start." Cf United States v. Soleto, 436 U.S.
268 (1978) (discussing relation of "fresh start" policy and non-dischargeability of certain taxes).
156 See cases discussed supra notes 56-57.
157 See generally JACKSON, LOGIC AND LiMITs, supra note 130, at 225-28. See also Eisenberg, Bank-
ruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 976-83 (1981);Jackson, The Fresh-Start Polity in Bank-
ruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1395-99 (1985).
158 See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LiMrrs, supra note 130, at 226-28, where Professor Jackson observes:
Because discharge policy historically has been embodied in bankruptcy law, we sometimes
lose sight of the distinction between the law of discharge and the law relating to the credi-
tor-oriented function of bankruptcy .... [M]ost of bankruptcy law is concerned not with
defining a debtor's right of discharge but with providing a compulsory and collective forum
for satisfying the claims of creditors .... The fresh-start policy is thus substantively unre-
lated to the creditor-oriented distributional rules that give bankruptcy law its general shape
and complexity.
Id. at 226-27 (footnote omitted).
159 See id. After observing the substantive distinction between "fresh start" and the debt-collec-
tion goal of bankruptcy, Professor Jackson recognizes that:
Nonetheless, the link between the two [goals] is not surprising. If an individual were
allowed to demand discharge as long as he agreed to surrender certain assets, he would be
likely to avail himself of that right only when his liabilities exceeded his assets.... Because
bankruptcy's collective process achieves such a coordinated 'sharing [among creditors], it
serves an appropriate function once the decision to discharge debts has been made. Never-
theless, the justifications for discharge do not relate to the concerns of the creditors.
Id. at 227 (footnote omitted). See also Weistart, The Costs of Bankruptcy, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1977, at 107, 108-10.
160 See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1933). See also JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS,
supra note 130, at 223-52. The policy determinations in "fresh start" policy are debtor-oriented
because they represent concern for the debtor's future, to the detriment of creditors.
161 See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 130, at 226-27 (discussing the "creditor-oriented
distributional rules that give bankruptcy law its general shape and complexity").
162 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1328, and 362. But see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (limiting the scope of"fresh
start" policy in bankruptcy via exceptions to discharge).
163 See supra notes 149-150. On the judicial recognition of the importance of "fresh start" as a
goal in bankruptcy law, see, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); see also Lines v.
Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970) (per curiam) (noting that the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act was to
provide the debtor with a " 'new opportunity in life' " and a" 'clear field for future effort'" (quoting
Local Loan, supra)). See also Combs v. Richardson, 838 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[a] primary
purpose of bankruptcy law is to give honest debtors a fresh start 'unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt' " (quoting Lines v. Frederick, supra)); and U.S. Dep't of Health
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The exceptions to discharge, 164 however, reflect a desire to protect credi-
tors' interests. 
165
Although "fresh start" policy has been defended on a number of
grounds, 166 it began in England merely as a device to entice debtors
to fully disclose their assets in bankruptcy for distribution to credi-
tors. 167 Inducement to full disclosure has since given way to considera-
tions of allocation of risk,1 6 8 contract impossibility,
169 insurance,17 0
and Human Serv. v. Smith, 807 F.2d 122, 123 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[tlhe bankruptcy laws embody a
congressional policy to free an honest debtor from his financial burdens and thus to allow him to
make an unencumbered fresh start"). The exceptions to discharge contained in the Bankruptcy
Code, however, limit the breadth of this "fresh start." See, e.g., Boyle v. Abilene Lumber, Inc. (In re
Boyle), 819 F.2d 583, 587 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[t]he general policy of bankruptcy law favors allowing
the debtor to discharge debts and to make a fresh start. This policy, however, is subject to excep-
tions for certain types of debts, including those arising from the debtor's malfeasance"(footnotes
omitted)).
164 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
165 The enumerated exceptions to discharge in § 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code protect certain
creditors with rights in certain types of debts by limiting the scope of discharge. The extent of this
protection is substantially less in Chapter 13 than in Chapter 7, however. See supra note 95 and
accompanying text.
166 See infra notes 168-173 and accompanying text.
167 See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 130, at 226-27 n.4, where the author examines the
historical perspective of discharge:
[F]rom a historical perspective discharge is a relatively recent addition to bankruptcy
law.... A statute passed in 1705 allowed merchants to be discharged of their debts, see 4
Anne, ch. 17, § 7 (1705), but the discharge was conceived more as a means to encourage
merchants to disclose their assets to creditors (and thus to facilitate collection) than as a
way to give individuals a fresh start.
Id.
168 See, e.g., Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953 (1981), where Professor
Eisenberg considers arguments in favor of bankruptcy discharge, and consequently "fresh start"
policy. In considering the economics of discharge, he states:
A discharge system provides a technique for allocating the risk of financial distress between
a debtor and his creditors....
There are two factors to explore in deciding which party is the superior bearer of the
risk of financial distress of bankruptcy. A party maybe a better risk bearer because he is in a
better position to prevent the risk from occurring. This factor would almost always weigh
against a broadly available discharge. Debtors in general have greater control of their fi-
nancial activities than any particular lender.
Id. at 981-82 (footnotes omitted). For the second factor in assessing proper allocation of risk as a
justification of discharge, Eisenberg considers "which party to a contract is the superior insurer." Id.
at 982. He concludes that the ability to insure against the financial failure of the debtor is not always
on the creditor. Id. See also Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393,
1399-1401 (1985).
169 Professor Eisenberg has analogized discharge, and hence "fresh start," to contract principles
of impossibility. He compares the economic analysis which underlies impossibility to that which
underlies bankruptcy discharge:
Outside of bankruptcy, Professor Posner and others have offered an economic analysis
of impossibility, an issue closely akin to that of discharge. Their analysis focuses on the
event giving rise to the claim of impossibility and asks which party could have better insured
against that event. To apply this analysis in bankruptcy, which can be viewed as a claim of
impossibility with respect to all of one's obligations on the basis of general financial dis-
tress, one must then decide whether the debtor or a creditor is the superior insurer against
that cause.
Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 982 (footnotes omitted).
170 This consideration rests on the question of which party would better be able to insure against
the financial failure of the debtor. See Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 982; see also Jackson, supra note
168, at 1399-1400.
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limited liability,171 debtor rehabilitation,17 2 and others. 173 All of the
arguments support the conclusion that "fresh start" is a policy primarily
geared toward voluntary "credit" relationships 174 in a credit-based econ-
171 See Jackson, supra note 168, at 1399-1401, where the author bases discharge and "fresh start"
policy on a theory of limited liability for individuals which resembles limited liability in corporation
law. Professor Jackson discusses two common justifications for limited liability of corporations:
Discharge may be viewed as a form of limited liability for individuals-a legal construct
that stems from the same desire, and serves the same purposes, as does limited liability for
corporations....
Both of [the reasons making limited liability appropriate for corporations] could also
support limited liability for individuals. [F]irst, the creditors of an individual, having gained
experience through dealing with many debtors, may be more adept than the individual at
monitoring his borrowing.... Moreover, [t]o the extent that individuals can invest their
capital in... income-producing assets, they can further their desire to avoid risk by diversi-
fying their holdings. Yet an individual's capital may consist largely ofhuman capital... and
this particular form of property cannot readily be invested in assets with differing risk
characteristics.
Id. at 1400 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Professor Jackson concludes that "like busi-
ness associations that find the corporate form and its accompanying limited liability worth the in-
crease in the cost of credit, individuals may also derive a net benefit from the limited liability that
discharge affords them." Id. (footnote omitted).
172 Debtor rehabilitation has been a further policy consideration underlying fresh start and dis-
charge. It is a consideration which has been expressly noted by courts. See, e.g., Jennon v. Hunter
(In re Hunter), 771 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1985); Federal Land Bank of Louisville v. Olenn (In re
Olenn), 760 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (6th Cir. 1985) (Chapter 13 provides debtors greater relief than the
former Bankruptcy Act to "encourage consumer debtor rehabilitation rather than liquidation").
173 See, e.g., Shuchman, An Attempt at a Philosophy of Bankruptcy, 21 UCLA L. REv. 403 (1973),
where the author argues that bankruptcy law is at least "class legislation" which is primarily geared
toward "the lower middle class, semi-skilled, blue collar worker" as opposed to the "poor." Id at
423-24 (footnote omitted). In conjunction with this view, seeJackson, supra note 168, at 1401-04,
which likens bankruptcy discharge with other "social safety nets" in form and effect.
See also JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMrrs, supra note 130, at 226-252. Professor Jackson explores
certain volitional and cognitive justifications of fresh start policy, arguing that:
[A] key to bankruptcy discharge policy has to do with inherent biases-uncorrected by mar-
ketplace constraints-in the ways most individuals make decisions that lead them to over-
consume and undersave. This view, in turn, is based on available evidence that suggests
that many people systematically fail to pursue their own long-term interests when making
decisions about whether to spend today or save for tomorrow.... [In order to justify a
nonvaluable right to discharge, it must be shown that individuals systematically judge (or
ignore) their own interests and that this bias consistently leads them in one direction to
consume too much and save too little.
Id. at 233 (emphasis in original).
But cf. Weistart, The Costs of Bankruptcy, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Autumn 1977, at 107, sur-
veying arguments against permitting discharge:
Granting discharges may erode the degree of responsibility with which the debtor ap-
proaches his affairs and may lessen his incentive to avoid overextension. To the extent that
we remove the penalty for insolvency we may actually nudge debtors down the path of
imprudence and thus foster the tragedies that attend the disintegration of personal estates.
Finally, it would be urged that a contract is a contract, and a creditor who gave fair consid-
eration to his debtor is entitled to the promised return, even if he is required to wait for its
receipt.
Id at 110.
174 Allocation of risk, contract impossibility, insurance and the other considerations which un-
derly fresh start policy assume at their core that the obligation was freely entered into by both parties
to the transaction. There can be "involuntary creditors," however, which did not consent to the
extension of credit before it was made. An example would be judgment creditors of torts. When a
person is hit by a car, he involuntarily becomes a creditor of the tortfeasor, the claim being the as yet
unliquidated civil judgment. Such "involuntary creditors" are often included in the Bankrupty
Code. But see I 1 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), where judgment debts arising from intentional torts are not
dischargeable in Chapter 7 cases. They are, however, dischargeable in Chapter 13 cases.
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omy. 17 5 Because criminal sentences, including restitution, arise out of
involuntary occurrences from the perspective of the victim, "fresh start"
policy cannot be used to justify discharge of criminal sentences. Thus,
the policy which underlies discharge is not advanced by the discharge of
criminal restitution.
2. History and "First Principles" of Criminal Restitution
After considering the policies which underlie bankruptcy discharge,
the scope of discharge remains to be fleshed out in each particular in-
stance. In the conflict over the dischargeability of criminal restitution,
this leads to a consideration of the "first principles" which underlie crim-
inal restitution and criminal law generally. Modern concepts of criminal
sentencing, including criminal restitution, are the product of a long
evolution which began in the earliest stages of history. 176 Central to
Western sentencing theory has been the notion that criminal law and
criminal sentencing are directed against those who adversely affect soci-
ety.' 77 Criminal sanctions and sentences represent ajudgment that soci-
etal sanctions and stigma should be given to those who violate the moral
norms and minimal standards of conduct required in a civilized soci-
ety. 178 The determination of whether to attach such stigma and sanc-
175 See generally REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, ch. 3, 81-87 (1973), for the relationship between bank-
ruptcy discharge and a credit-based economy.
176 See A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 1-20 (1978 & Supp. 1987) (tracing the growth and
evolution of criminal sentencing theory and practice from tribal times to its present form, and noting
a trend away from harsh sanctions toward sentences geared to specific goals); and N. KITrRIE & E.
ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING, AND CORRECTIONS 3-11 (1981) (considering the history and evolu-
tion of criminal sentencing theory and practice).
177 See generally R. FERGUSON & A. STOKKE, CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAw (1976), where the authors
survey accepted definitions of crime:
Crime over the years has had many definitions ranging from the simplest: that a crime
is a public offense against the state, to a more complicated statement that defines crime as a
course of conduct or practice that is detrimental to public welfare and that is prohibited.
Crime can further be defined as an act committed or omitted in violation of a law forbidding
or commanding it and to which is annexed, upon conviction, certain penalties.
Id. at 61. See also B. WHITE, CRIMES AND PENALTIES 3 (1970) ("[c]riminal law is in essence a means of
social control, and grows even more complex in our complex society").
178 See C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw (1978), discussing the relationship between crimi-
nal law and morality:
The criminal law does not attempt to impose or enforce the standards of any particular
religion .... In a general way it may be said that the aim of a religion ... is, inter alia, the
setting of maximum standards for the guidance of human conduct. As a practical matter,
the law could not insist that every individual attain such high standards. The law must
content itself with establishing and maintaining minimum standards-i.e., standards which
are attainable by virtually all individuals-and punishing the failure to conform therewith as
a crime.
Id. at 17.
It is important to note, however, that there is some relationship between the individual
law and morality. For, many acts which are condemned by the law as crimes are also con-
demned by moral principles. Moreover, society punishes certain conduct as a crime not
merely because it is necessary as a matter of collective self-defense, but because the conduct
runs counter to certain moral standards entertained by the organized community known as
the state.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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tions to certain conduct, and to what extent, has primarily been left to
the'states in our system of government. 179
In addition, there has been a trend away from sentencing schemes
which impose a set penalty for each crime regardless of the circum-
stances. 180 The current movement is toward sentencing schemes which
look to both the nature of the crime and of the offender.' 18 As a result of
this emphasis on such fact-specific indicia, sentencing courts now have
great discretion to fashion sentences which match the offender and his
crime.' 8 2 In exercising this sentencing discretion, courts consider four
basic objectives which help make the sentence fit the crime. 183 The four
goals of criminal sentencing are: general and special deterrence; 8 4 pro-
179 See R. FERGUSON & A. STOKKE, supra note 177, at 53, where the authors discuss limitations of
federal criminal law:
Since no mention of common-law crimes is made in the United States Constitution, the
Tenth Amendment by implication gives the states the power to regulate and define crimes
such as murder and theft .... In sum, the federal government can act only under specific
grants of power; the states cover everything else.
Id. Any strictures the Tenth Amendment places on federal power in criminal law have proved to be
somewhat illusory, however. See generally N. ABRAMS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
(1986). Professor Abrams discusses how federal criminal law has expanded to cover "traditional"
state crimes:
Conduct comprising traditional crimes-the kind that makes up the normal caseload in
state court systems-is also subject to prosecution in the federal courts under federal law
when the offense occurs on federal property, or where federal moneys are affected or fed-
eral personnel are injured or killed .... Criminal conduct that does not involve such direct
federal interests is also prosecuted by the federal government; the crimes involved are usu-
ally based on the commerce power.
Id- at 63.
180 See A. CAMPBELL, supra note 176, at 12 ("[s]entencing trends in this country and elsewhere
have generally reflected a reduction of harsh sanctions").
181 See id. There has been a "recognition that for both society's protection and the sake ofjustice
a criminal sentence should consider the character of the criminal as well as the nature of the crime."
See also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("punishment should fit the offender and not
merely the crime"); and People v. Tijerina, 632 P.2d 570, 571 (Colo. 1981) ("court must consider
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the public interest in safety and
deterrence").
182 See R. DAWSON, SENTENCING-THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SEN-
TENCE xix (1969) ("[s]tudy of the criminal justice systems makes very clear that the 'exercise of dis-
cretionary power is the lifeblood' of the criminal justice process").
183 As with any distillation of a complex system such as modern criminal sentencing, no broad
categorization of goals will cover every consideration. See A. CAMPBELL, supra note 176, at 21
("[b]oth courts and commentators agree that sentencing practices throughout the United States do
not rest upon any one sentencing rationale"); see also R. DAWSON, supra note 182, at 7 (there are
"[o]ther criteria" which arise in day-to-day practice. "[C]orrectional decisions are based on numer-
ous criteria onlysome of which conform to these commonly held assumptions. Thus, the encourage-
ment of guilty pleas very commonly influences the decision to grant or deny probation and.., the
length of the prison sentence").
184 See A. CAMPBELL, supra note 176, at 24-27, noting that:
As a sentencing rationale deterrence embraces both the concepts of general deterrence
and special deterrence.... General deterrence signifies criminal sanctions imposed for the
purpose of discouraging the general public from recourse to crime. Special deterrence re-
fers to sanctions imposed for the purpose discouraging the specific offender from repeating
the same or other criminal acts. ...
Both general and special deterrence... support a single aim of crime prevention.
Id. at 24 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., State v. Ogata, 95 Idaho 309, 508 P.2d 141, 148 (1973); Thes-
sen v. State, 508 P.2d 1192, 1197 (Alaska 1973).
See also N. KITrRIE & E. ZENOFF, supra note 176, at 19-23; and C. TORCIA, supra note 178, at 13-
14 ("the efficacy of punishment as a deterrent cannot be measured. There are no statistics as to
crimes which have not been committed because the actor was deterred by the prospect of
punishment").
1989] NOTE
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tection of society;18 5 retribution; 186 and rehabilitation of the offender. 18 7
There are many sentencing alternatives to achieve these basic goals. 88
Sentencing courts choose the one alternative, or combination of alterna-
tives, which most appropriately serves the four basic goals of sentencing
and accounts for the individual circumstances of the criminal and his
crime. '89
One alternative to incarceration is a sentence of probation condi-
tioned on the probationer following certain conduct. 190 The range of
permissible conditions to probation is expansive and left largely to the
discretion of the court.19l Such conditions may restrict the freedom of
the probationer l9 2 or impose affirmative obligations.' 9 3 Fundamentally,
185 This goal has also been referred to as "incapacitation of the offender," see A. CAMPBELL, supra
note 176, at 27-30. See also N. KrrRIE & E. ZENOFF, supra note 176, at 23-30.
186 This goal has also been referred to as "vindication of social order." See A. CAMPBELL, supra
note 176, at 31-34, where the author states:
As a sentencing rationale, vindication of the social order is often discussed under vari-
ous labels-the most common of which is "retribution"....
The first source [of this rationale] is the apparent need in a significant sector of society
to believe that by punishing the offender the "balancing of right and wrong" can be restored
to that social order....
The second principal source for the vindication rationale is [that v]iolators of the law-
any law-must suffer social sanctions for the sake of continued survival of the rule of law
itself.
Id. at 31-32 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). See also N. KrrrRiE & E. ZENOFF, supra note
176, at 39-46.
187 See A. CAMPBELL, supra note 176, at 34-41, where Professor Campbell states:
As a sentencing rationale rehabilitation seeks to prevent an offender from repeating
criminal behavior by subjecting the person to "cure" or substantially reduce the person's
criminal propensities....
Rehabilitation is based upon the theory that crime is a disease that for any number of
reasons has taken control of an offender's behavior.
Id. at 34 (footnotes omitted). See also N. KIrrIE & E. ZENOFF, supra note 176, at 30-39.
188 E.g., incarceration, fines, costs, restitution, forfeiture, probation, work-release, or any combi-
nation, or the death penalty. See generally A. CAMPBELL, supra note 176, at 43-71. See also, e.g., FED-
ERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1988).
189 See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
190 Under a sentence of probation, the offender is not incarcerated, but allowed to return to
society. This release is conditioned, however, on the offender following certain conduct under the
supervision of the state criminal justice system. See A. CAMPBELL, supra note 176, at 51-57; see also R.
DAwsoN, supra note 182, at 67-168. Should the probationer fail to conform to the required conduct,
limited freedom may be revoked and he could be incarcerated. Id. at 142-168.
191 See, e.g., supra note 6. See also generally A. CAMPBELL, supra note 176, at 81-86; and R. DAwsoN,
supra note 182, at 100-121.
There are, however, possible conditions on probation which have been held impermissible. It
has been held "as a general rule that conditions will be deemed impermissible if they bear no rela-
tionship to the probationer's original crime, relate to conduct not criminal in itself, or require or
forbid conduct not reasonably related to future criminality." R. DAwsoN, supra note 182, at 86-87
(footnote omitted). See, e.g., Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980) (probation con-
ditions requiring forfeiture of assets, and full-time charity work for three years without pay are im-
proper when they do not leave enough time to the probationer for gainful employment).
192 See, e.g., United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1980) (offender restricted from partic-
ipating in federal or state political activity after conviction of unlawful electioneering); and United
States v. Miller, 549 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1976) (condition that probationer abstain from consuming
alcohol is valid), reh 'g denied, 558 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir. 1977). See also A. CAMPBELL, supra note 176, at
85-86.
193 One example of such an affirmative obligation is a requirement that the probationer make
payments in restitution as a condition to his continued freedom. There are other possible permissi-
ble affirmative conditions, however. See, e.g., United States v. Stine, 675 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1982)
(condition that probationer undergo mandatory psychological counselling).
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a sentence of probation is an attempt "to provide an individualized pro-
gram offering a young or unhardened offender an opportunity to rehabil-
itate himself without institutional confinement ... under the continuing
power of the court to impose institutional punishment."
1 94
Although criminal restitution is a permissible and appropriate condi-
tion to probation, 95 it may also be given independently of other ele-
ments of a criminal sentence. 196 Criminal restitution, whether given
independently or as a condition to probation, goes to the rehabilitative
function of criminal sentencing. 97 In addition to the rehabilitative func-
tion, criminal restitution has found support in the recent weight given
the interests of crime victims in criminal sentencing. 98 On another
level, insofar as criminal restitution is a sentencing alternative at the dis-
posal of the sentencing court, it represents one aspect of the important
sentencing discretion of the criminal court.' 9 9 The goal of rehabilitating
the offender would be frustrated if a sentence of criminal restitution,
given as a condition to probation or standing alone, were allowed to be
discharged in bankruptcy. 200 Such a discharge would also have a chilling
effect on sentencing courts in the exercise of their discretion insofar as it
would effectively limit the range of choices available for fashioning an
appropriate sentence. 20 '
There is a further incongruity inherent in attempts to discharge
criminal restitution. As discussed, bankruptcy discharge is founded in
the "fresh start" policy.20 2 "Fresh start" policy is primarily geared to-
194 Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943).
195 See generally H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEls, PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO VICTIM6S OF CRIME (1974);J.
HUDSON & B. GALAwAY, RESTITUTION IN CRIMINALJUSTICE (1975); S. SCHAFER, COMPENSATION AND
RESTrrUTION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME (1970); Harland, supra note 19; and Laster, Criminal Restitution: A
Survey of its Past History and an Analysis of its Present Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. REv. 71 (1970).
196 See, e.g., supra note 6. See also Harland, supra note 19, at 69-77.
197 See Laster, supra note 195, at 80-83, where the author discusses the goals of criminal restitu-
tion as an alternative to incarceration:
Custody conflicts with rehabilitation, if for no other reason than that [it] forces a man to
adjust to prison society while [criminal restitution] encourages him to learn to adjust to a
different "normal" society. One benefit of a meaningful system of restitution is that it
would keep the criminal within the normal society and thus prevent him from having to
adjust to prison.... At the same time, it would allow the offender to support himself and
his family.
Id. at 81 (footnote omitted). Cf Note, Court-Ordered Criminal Restitution in Washington, 62 WASH. L.
REV. 357, 358 (1987) ("[c]ommentators have justified restitution in criminal sentencing on grounds
of rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution, and compensation. [It has been] suggested that restitution
may improve an offender's self image and sense of control over his or her life").
There may also be other, more utilitarian justifications for probation conditioned on restitution
as an alternative to incarceration. See, eg., Intensive Probation can Reduce Needfor Prisons, Study Finds, 18
CRIM.JusT. NEWSL., Feb. 17, 1987, at 6.
198 See Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 357 (1986);
Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss. LJ. 515 (1982); and Note, State
Legislation in Aid of Victims and Witnesses of Crime, 10 J. LEGIS. 394 (1983).
199 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Note, supra note 197, at 360 (Wash-
ington statutes "give courts wide discretion to order criminal defendants to make restitution").
200 The rehabilitative function of criminal restitution would be eliminated. However, proponents
of the dischargeability of criminal restitution might see the rehabilitative function of discharge re-
place the offender rehabilitative function of criminal restitution. See, e.g., Ballam, supra note 47. See
also supra note 172.
201 See supra note 87, and In re Davenport, 89 Bankr. 428, 430 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
202 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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ward voluntary extensions of credit.20 3 Criminal restitution, however, is
based on the goals of rehabilitating the offender, and allowing the sen-
tencing court to fashion a sentence which will match the criminal of-
fender and his crime. These important rehabilitative and discretionary
aspects of criminal restitution must be considered in addition to the fact
that the underlying criminal act is involuntary from the perspective of the
victim and the state.
B. Civil Law v. Criminal Law Generally
The limits of "fresh start" policy, and thus bankruptcy discharge,
become even more apparent when one considers the conflict on the level
of the fundamental distinction between civil and criminal law. Bank-
ruptcy law and fresh start policy must be limited by the parameters of the
civil law. The conflict between bankruptcy discharge and criminal resti-
tution is a manifestation of the tension between civil and criminal law.20 4
Generally, civil law governs disputes between individuals, and its pur-
pose is to hold individuals accountable vis-i-vis each other.20 5 Bank-
ruptcy law is a facet of the civil law in that it is geared toward the debtor's
financial affairs in relation to his creditors. 20 6 There is no societal judg-
ment inherent in the bankruptcy process. 20 7 Criminal law, however, rep-
resents a settlement of conflicts between individual offenders and
society.208 Criminal law is based upon societal norms that establish stan-
203 See supra notes 168-173 and accompanying text.
204 Criminal restitution, because of its compensatory aspect, has been criticized as an inherently
civil device, out of place in criminal sentencing. The compensatory aspect, however, is a side-effect
which is not part of the core of criminal restitution. See Laster, supra note 195, at 80, where the
compensatory aspect is distinguished from the true goal:
[T]he concept of restitution as used here differs from the term "compensation to vic-
tims of crime." Restitution by the criminal to his victim implies a making whole of the
victim, as much as possible, by the direct action of the criminal. Compensation to the
victims of crime involves a monetary payment by the state to those persons injured by crimi-
nal acts. The difference between the two is that compensation is "an indication of the re-
sponsibility of society" to the victim, whereas restitution, while restoring the victim, is also
therapeutic and aids in the rehabilitation of the criminal.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Cf Harland, supra note 19, at 56 (identifying "an histori-
cal background of divergent views concerning the soundness of civil-criminal distinctions," but con-
cluding that criminal restitution has found "growing support" regardless of questions as to the
"propriety of enforcing civil liability through the criminal process").
205 See generally 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 5-373 (1959), noting that "[flaw in the sense of legal
order has for its subject matter relations of individual human beings with each other and the conduct
of individuals so far as they affect others or affect the social or economic order." Id. at 5. See also W.
ROBINSON, ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 170-73 (1900) (discussing the divergence be-
tween "Private Law" and "Public Law").
206 See supra notes 142-43.
207 But cf B. WEISS, THE HELL OF THE ENGLISH-BANKRUPTCY AND THE VICTORIAN NOVEL 35-36
(1986) ("connotations of inferior social class and criminal origin that clung to the idea of bank-
ruptcy" reinforced "the moral repugnance with which the Victorians regarded it"); see also D. STAN-
LEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 142, at 2 ("the American people in general disapprove of bankruptcy").
These considerations, however, do not rise to the level of the stigma inherent in criminal law. See
infra note 210 and accompanying text.
208 See E. WASHBURN, A MANUAL OF CRIMINAL LAw 1 (1889), which states:
[Tihe purposes of judicial process in respect to [civil law] are to obtain recompense or
satisfaction for the party who has been thereby injured; while, as to [criminal law], such
proceedings have reference to the prevention of such wrongs rather than obtaining thereby
compensation.... [To be within the criminal law] the wrong must be one of a public nature
in its character.
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dards of minimal behavior necessary for the continuation of a civilized
society. 20 9 There is a stigma following a criminal conviction not found in
bankruptcy or civil law generally.210 This in turn mandates the stricter
protections, both procedural and substantive, found in criminal proceed-
ings. 21' Because criminal restitution is rooted in criminal law, is assigned
in criminal proceedings, and carries the stigma of a criminal conviction, it
should be viewed as existing on a higher level than that affected by bank-
ruptcy law.
In In re Moore,2 12 the court noted the distinction between civil and
criminal obligations and limited the scope of the Bankruptcy Act to civil
liabilities. 213 In addition, many state courts, relying on the distinction
between civil and criminal law, have insisted that their sentences of crimi-
nal restitution are unaffected by federal bankruptcy law. 21 4 Thus, the
scope of bankruptcy law must be viewed as existing within a scope de-
fined by both its purposes and goals, as well as the purposes and goals of
the areas of law which it affects.
C. Considerations of Supremacy, Comity, and Federalism
Criminal sentencing in state criminal proceedings has traditionally
been exempt from federal interference. 21 5 Indeed, the Court in Kelly v.
Robinson 216 noted that "the States' interest in administering their crimi-
nal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most pow-
erful of the considerations that should influence a court considering
Id See also C. TORCIA, supra note 178, at 20-21.
209 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
210 See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), where the Court discussed the basis of the
deterrent effect of punishment and the stigma that attaches:
Quite probably this deterrent effect can be largely attributed to the harsh moral attitude
which our society has traditionally taken toward intoxication.... Criminal conviction rep-
resents the degrading public revelation of what Anglo-American society has long con-
demned as a moral defect, and the existence of criminal sanctions may serve to reinforce
this cultural taboo ....
Id. at 531.
211 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V.
212 111 F. 145 (W.D. Ky. 1901), discussed supra note 47.
213 Id. at 149-50 ("provisions of the bankrupt act have reference alone to civil liabilities, as de-
mands between a debtor and creditor, as such, and not to punishments inflicted pro bono publico
for crimes committed"). But cf In re Alderson, supra note 47 (declining to distinguish between civil
and criminal obligations).
214 See, e.g., People v. Mosesson, 78 Misc. 2d 217, 356 N.Y.S.2d 483, 484 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974),
stating:
A discharge in bankruptcy has no effect whatsoever upon a condition of restitution of a
criminal sentence. A bankruptcy proceeding is civil in nature and is intended to relieve an honest
but unfortunate debtor of his debts and to permit him to financial life anew .... A condi-
tion of restitution in a sentence of probation is a part of thejudgment ofconviction. It does
not create a debtor/creditor relationship ....
356 N.Y.S.2d at 484 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also People v. Topping Bros., 79 Misc.
2d 260, 262, 359 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987-88 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1974).
215 See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. at 43-44 ("[c]ourts traditionally have been reluctant to inter-
pret federal bankruptcy statutes to remit state criminal judgments"). The Court noted that judicial
deferrence to state criminal law had grown to the level of a "judicial exception to discharge for
criminal sentences." Some commentators, however, have challenged that assertion. Cf Ballam,
supra note 148, at 122 ("[c]ase law ... does not support the Court's assertion that ajudicially created
exception preventing discharge of restitution orders existed in 1978").
216 479 U.S. 39 (1986).
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equitable types of relief .... This reflection of our federalism must also
influence our interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code ..,, "217 Such "in-
fluence" can only go so far, however. Federalism may be an important
value implicitly embodied in the Constitution, but it is not an express
constitutional mandate. Preemption via the Supremacy Clause is explic-
itly provided for in the Constitution.21 8 Thus, federalism can be only
one of the many considerations in the preemption analysis.
Perez v. Campbell 219 presented the Court with a state statute that pur-
ported to exempt its civil and administrative sanctions from the dis-
charge provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.2 20 The Court stated that its
"function is to determine whether a challenged state statute 'stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.' "221 The state statute in Perez was preempted
pursuant to the "controlling principle that any state legislation which
frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the
Supremacy Clause." 222 Thus, the "full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress" must first be determined. 223 If the purposes and goals of bank-
ruptcy law, as discussed above,224 are not frustrated by exempting state
criminal sentences from its operation, then there should be no
preemption.
IV. Solutions
Possible solutions to the conflict over the dischargeability of criminal
restitution may be reached through both the legislative and judicial
branches. A solution should be found, however, that provides broader
guidance for the resolution of future disputes involving the appropriate
scope of the Bankruptcy Code.
A. Judicial
Although the issues presented in conflicts between bankruptcy law
and state substantive law are complex and often involve hard choices be-
tween compelling policy objectives, 225 courts should not mistreat or
avoid such complex issues by relying on an ad hoc methodology. 226 In-
stead, courts should follow a uniform and coherent rationale which looks
to the "first principles" of the areas of law in conflict, while at the same
time exercising deference toward the policy determinations represented
217 Id. at 49 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). See also supra notes 87-88 and accompanying
text.
218 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
219 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
220 In Perez, the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, 1951 Ariz. Sess. Laws 300 (cur-
rent version at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1101 to 28-1261 (1989)), which provided for suspension
of licenses and registration for non-payment ofjudgments arising out of automobile accidents, 402
U.S. at 641, purported to be unaffected by discharge under the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 642.
221 402 U.S. at 649 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
222 402 U.S. at 652.
223 "[Flull purposes and objectives" in this case are the "first principles" and fundamental objec-
tives of the Bankruptcy Code.
224 See supra notes 141-203 and accompanying text.
225 See, e.g., supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
226 See supra note 11.
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in other areas of law. The order of inquiry should begin with a consider-
ation of the statutes which are in conflict. When the statutory provisions
do not clarify the dispute, courts should also consider the areas of law
involved on a more fundamental level.2 27 Although the Court in Kelly v.
Robinson seemed to employ a limited form of this analysis,228 it relied on
the wording of only a single sentence of the Bankruptcy Code. 229 In or-
der for bankruptcy law to develop in an organized way, courts should
develop its foundational goals and policies into well-articulated doctrine.
This doctrine then could replace the irreconcilable results of the ad hoc
methodology with coherent analysis and consistent results.
Considering the goals and policies involved as a foundation, courts
should proceed to systematically define the proper scope of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Before reaching the question of whether criminal restitu-
tion is a debt subject to the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,
courts must first decide whether federal bankruptcy law can affect such a
criminal sentence at all. If a court decides that criminal restitution is not
subject to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, it must still resolve the
complex question of how to handle the criminal restitution obligation in
relation to the disposition of the debtor's assets. In keeping with what
could be called a "complete separation" doctrine, which would exclude
bankruptcy law from interfering with state criminal law, bankruptcy
courts should simply leave that which is criminal to the criminal
courts. 23 0 This is, in effect, the result in Chapter 7 after Kelly v. Robin-
son23t The Chapter 13 repayment approach is not handled so easily,
however, because it directly impacts on a debtor's future earnings. 23 2 A
few courts have suggested that an obligation of criminal restitution
should be included in the debtor's expenses and provided for as non-
disposable income.23 3 Even though this view is not specifically endorsed by
the letter of the Bankruptcy Code, it is consistent with the "complete
227 See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
228 The Court did consider some of the history of American bankruptcy law in its interpretation
of the Bankruptcy Code, but neglected to consider the "first principles" of the law involved.
229 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
230 This "complete separation" approach has been criticized by one commentator as a "simplistic
view." See Ballam, supra note 148, at 125.
231 After Kelly v. Robinson, § 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge any sen-
tence of criminal restitution, see supra note 88. This, in effect, leaves intact the criminal sentence of
restitution for the criminal court to deal with in the manner the state has chosen to handle supervi-
sion of its probation system.
232 The restitution obligation must be provided for in some way. In a Chapter 13 case, the repay-
ment plan takes into account all obligations of the debtor. If the criminal restitution obligation is
not provided for, then the debtor would not be able to pay it because his income is already allocated
to other obligations.
233 See, e.g., In re Cancel, 82 Bankr. 674, 677 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 85
Bankr. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (discussed supra notes 106-110). In Cancel, the Bankruptcy Court stated:
In concluding that state-ordered criminal restitution payments are not debts .... this
court is not troubled by what was referred to by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals as the
"anomolous result" that the holder of a right to restitution would thereby have no right to
participate in [bankruptcy distribution]. In the Chapter 13 context, the amount of the
debtor's disposable income available to make payments under the plan is only determined
after all fixed and necessary expenses are deducted from income. Clearly, a criminal resti-
tution payment which is ordered as a condition of probation would constitute a necessary
expense that would be first subtracted in determining the debtor's disposable income avail-
able to pay debts under the plan.
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separation" view that criminal sentences should be unaffected by bank-
ruptcy proceedings.
B. Legislative
Clearly, the simplest solution to the conflict over the dischargeability
of criminal restitution would be the addition of an exception to discharge
covering criminal restitution.234 However, although such an amendment
might resolve the status of criminal restitution, it would not provide gui-
dance for future definition of the scope of the Bankruptcy Code.235 Con-
gress should amend the Bankruptcy Code in the area where judicial
interpretation first went astray. To this end, Congress could attach lan-
guage to the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "claim" that would ex-
pressly limit the scope of the Bankruptcy Code. Such language could be
borrowed from the exception to the automatic stay for the "commence-
ment or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the
debtor." 236  While remaining consistent with the policy behind the
"criminal action or proceeding" exception to the automatic stay,237 the
Bankruptcy Code's definition of "claim" could be amended to include:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-
tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured;
or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right
to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured or unsecured;
(C) but does not include any obligation of the debtor arising out of a crin-
nal action or proceeding against the debtor.
Id. at 677 (citation omitted). See also Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dep't of Welfare v. Johnson-
Allen, 88 Bankr. 659, 662 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1988); and Note, The Disposable hIcome Test: An Attempt Toward
Unifornil,, 4 BANKR. DEv. J. 221 (1987).
234 Such an amendment was proposed and passed in the U.S. Senate, S. 548, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987). Section 301 of S. 548 would add an exception to §§ 523(a) and 1328(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. The proposed exception would except from discharge any debt "to the extent that
such debt arises from a violation by the debtor of a civil or criminal law enforceable by an action by a
government unit to recover restitution, damages, civil penalties, attorney fees, costs or any other
relief ...." S. REP. No. 119, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1987). See also Bankruptcy Discharge of Obliga-
lions to Governmental Units: Hearing on H.R. 2619 Before the Subconmm. on .onopolies and Comnmercial Lau, of
the House Comnn. on theJudiciarY, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988) (H.R. 2619 was identical to S. 548).
In addition to the theoretical problems expressed below to such an amendment, there are seri-
ous problems with the language of S. 548 and H.R. 2619. The proposed exception extends to both
civil and criminal laws. Civil laws are more properly encompassed within the "fresh start" policy
discussed above. See supra notes 144-175 and accompanying text. In addition, the sweeping lan-
guage of the proposed exception is made even greater in scope by the word "enforceable." Thus, it
would appear that the "debt" need not in fact be the result of an action by a governmental unit,
rather it would be enough that it could have been brought by the government.
235 By amending the exceptions to discharge, Congress, like the Court in Robinson, would be ac-
cepting sub silentio that criminal sentences are within the scope of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, if
amendment is necessary, it should be directed at the scope-determining section of the Bankruptcy
Code-i.e., the definitions of "debt" and "claim."
236 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1).
237 In considering § 362(b)(1), the House Report noted that "bankruptcy laws are not a haven for
criminal offenders, but are designed to give relief from financial over-extension." H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6299.
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However, such an amendment would only resolve the issue of the
relation of criminal restitution to the Bankruptcy Code. The numerous
other conflicts between state and federal law and the Bankruptcy Code
would remain unresolved by such a narrow amendment. 238 The Bank-
ruptcy Code could also be given a new section outlining how its scope is
to be construed in relation to other independent areas of law. Such a
provision, however, would still be subject to judicial elaboration based
on the fundamental goals and policies of bankruptcy law.
V. Conclusion
In Kelly v. Robinson,23 9 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
resolve the issue of the dischargeability of criminal restitution. The
Court could also have provided lower bankruptcy courts with a clear and
coherent method for interpreting the Bankruptcy Code. The Court
chose, instead, to postpone such a resolution.240 Consequently, bank-
ruptcy courts, debtors, creditors, and state criminal justice officials have
no consistent or coherent way to deal with the interrelation of criminal
restitution and bankruptcy law. Instances have arisen in the past, and
will certainly arise in the future, for which Robinson provides little or no
guidance.24 1 A clear and well-reasoned statement is needed to resolve
the issue. Using a clear and coherent analysis of the fundamental goals
and policies of bankruptcy law and criminal sentencing, it is clear that
courts should consider criminal restitution and criminal law in general
completely'separate from bankruptcy law.24 2 Courts should use such an
analysis of fundamental goals and policies to resolve all issues requiring
definition of the scope of the Bankruptcy Code. Although bankruptcy
law holds an important place in this country's economic system, that po-
sition should not translate into the derrogation of state substantive law
absent express authorization of Congress. Even with such authorization,
deference should be shown to the states wherever possible.
MichaelJ. Donovan
238 See, e.g., supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
239 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
240 See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
241 See, e.g., supra notes 93-123 and accompanying text.
242 Such a result is consistent with the reasoning the Court employed in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971), where the Court stated:
Since the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few exceptions,
manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal
courts....
The precise reasons for this longstanding public policy against federal court interfer-
ence with state court proceedings have never been specifically identified but the primary
sources of the policy are plain.
Id. at 43 (citations omitted).
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